Thank you for your constructive and interesting reply, Fearless Founder. I cannot disagree with your considered view and I tend to agree partly on the following points –
You are quite probably correct in that Germany could have succeeded in an invasion attempt had she planned and prepared for just such an opportunity. As I have pointed out in my reply above to Grief1, I believe the Germans to be a resourceful and efficient people and their armed forces during the period in question were quite possibly the finest in recent history. Yet, notwithstanding Hitler’s reluctance to go to war with Britain in the first place, the Germans never seriously considered such an opportunity as the invasion of Britain would arise. A few inconclusive studies were carried out in the late 30’s, but no serious preparation was even begun until after the fall of France. And by that time it was far too late to equip the forces with the tools necessary for amphibious operations on the scale an Invasion of Britain would call for. Had they planned for this contingency at an earlier time, then things may have been different. However, as my original thesis was based on the events of the summer of 1940, my own opinion remains that, under the conditions then prevailing, an invasion was not feasible.
Your points on Naval warfare and the Royal Navy I also largely agree with. The RN would have exposed itself to considerable risk in attempting to interdict in the Straits of Dover. However, interdict it would surely have had to do if the Motherland had been under threat. Yet there are several points balancing your view – -Firstly, the weather in the English Channel at that time of year can be harsh. Fog and sea squalls are frequent and the normal routes used by shipping are exposed to many hazards and slip tides which can easily catch out novices, such as the Germans would be in amphibious operations at that time. Those weather conditions would also preclude the use of aircraft which would hand back to the Royal Navy the initiative in periods of poor weather or at night. -Secondly, the Luftwaffe at that time did not possess a bomb that the dive bombers could use heavy enough to penetrate the deck armour of the heavier British warships (500kg was the largest then available for the Stuka, I believe. Otherwise level bombing would have to be attempted which was not accurate enough against a target like shipping). So although much risk still exisited and damage could be caused, sinking those ships would be harder than it became later in the war. Additionally, apart from a few He59’s with the coastal units (called, correct me if I am wrong here Grief1 – Kustenfliegergruppe), the Luftwaffe did not possess an aircraft capable of carrying a torpedo. Later in the war, the He111 was adapted to carry a torpedo, but this was not available in 1940. The Luftwaffe, being a tactical air force, was not designed or trained to engage maritime targets as a strategic concept, unlike the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm, which was. And that possibly explains the poor results it achieved in the “Kanalkampf”, a situation not too dissimilar to an invasion with shipping in open water. -Thirdly, as Dunkirk was to prove, British destroyers proved notoriously difficult to hit even by Stukas, and the majority that were sunk (out of 11, I believe) were hit while stationary or while trying to manoeuvre in confined space. In open water, with typically a speed in excess of 28 – 30 knots, they would not have been easy to hit (although a near miss was often enough to put a destroyer out of action for repairs)
Your comments on Hitler I fully agree with. There was something in Hitler’s psyche that pushed him away from confrontation with Britain. He well understood Britain’s maritime power and to an extent envied it. Yet one cannot help but think that had he taken steps to prepare Germany for even a ‘possible’ war with Britain, he may have found himself in a stronger position than the one he occupied in June 1940. There is much to the theory that the speed of the successes achieved by Germany in 1939/40 took Germany and Hitler by surprise. Indeed, so surprised were they that no contingency existed to deal with the situation that then unfolded e.g. a defeated France and a severely weakened Great Britain. Had those contingencies existed, the sound basis of an invasion plan may have been possible.
As you said, I guess we shall never know the true extent to which these theories would stand up to the close scrutiny of prosecution. And that is, I guess, part of what makes that moment in history so fascinating a “what if” scenario.
