Folks,

Dux:

I can think of no other such popular TV program having been 'sent to Coventry' so-to-speak.

I was recently told a little story about our old pal Hymey. It may well be apocryphal however I was led to believe that it was factual. I was told that Hymey's powers of salesmanship were so prodigious that he once sold Farmer Drubbins a used milking machine taking Drubbins' only cow as the down payment.

And that story reminds me that it is time once again to post yet another 'down payment' on the full 12 chapters of "Sealion". Are you reading Wildman?

Sealion
BY: Zerosan2(the Magnificent)
HWH Continued
Page 83
8/16/04

PART FOUR
It might have happened this way.

06.17 hrs, 25th September 1940

Strategy.

The morning of the fourth day again dawned bright and clear, although early morning fog prevent much air activity before 10.00hrs. The weather people on both side predicted that it would stay fine now for several days. Little had changed during the night in positional terms. Folkestone fell during the early hours, and by dawn small vessels were able to use the small port facilities which had been captured relatively intact.

The Royal Navy, sensing the Germans reluctance to venture out in darkness again, used the night to their advantage. The battlecruiser “Repulse” together with the heavy cruiser “Devonshire”, sailed into the Thames estuary, as near to the coast as their draught would allow, and began to shell German positions as far inland as 18 miles. Much to the Germans consternation, who were unable to do anything about it, the shelling went on until the early hours, when the warships sailed north, out of Luftwaffe fighter range.

Halder considered his options that morning. The German strategy had been weighed carefully. Everyone concerned with its implementation knew any strategy for the invasion of Britain would be a risky one. And it was Halder and Brauchitsch who had persuaded Hitler that he could not turn his back on an undefeated Britain if he intended to fulfil his ambitions in the east.

Halder had known that the problem lay not so much in getting ashore, but in supplying such an undertaking in the face of British naval and air power, and hence in remaining ashore.

As a man of considerable military pedigree, he knew the British would be compelled to spread their forces thinly to defend the long miles of Britains eastern and southern coastlines. Initially then, it was therefore possible that the Germans could concentrate a sufficiently large force, even with the meagre transport resources available to them, to force the issue at a given point.

However, once ashore, the British would inevitably concentrate their available resources against this lodgement. It would then become a race to get forces and supplies ashore in order to establish, then expand the bridgehead, before the British could concentrate sufficiently to prevent this. If the Germans, with sufficient supplies and forces, could then break out of the lodgement in the south east, it was highly unlikely that the British would have the forces to contain them.

However, if the sealane bringing in supplies and reinforcements were to be strongly interdicted, the British, over more secure lines of communication, would win this race and expel the invaders with considerable losses to the German Army and its prestige. It was therefore a question of two battles. The battle on land to gain an initial position, and a battle at sea to keep lines of communication open.

The main issue here was this. In a purely naval battle, the British had a huge advantage of numbers. In the straits of Dover (and to a lesser extent, the English Channel), this advantage was reduced considerably by the Luftwaffe, the shore batteries, minefields and U-Boat threat. If the RN contested the crossings, in daylight, under the noses of these defences, the fight would be more equal.

However, the Luftwaffe was required to perform many tasks simultaneously. It was required to gain and, more importantly, maintain air superiority. It had been engaged on this task for many weeks already.

It was required to prevent, or at worst counterpoint, the Royal Navy from intervening in the channel crossing. And it was required to support the ground forces as an integral component of the concept of Blitzkrieg. It could not do the latter 2 tasks if it failed to achieve the first.

In essence then, the answer to the query from the American press concerning what detailed the threat from the RAF and the RN, the answer was simple.
The greatest single threat to the invasion was to its means of supply and communications, and that threat came primarily in the shape of the Royal Navy.

However, the means to counter the RN came in the shape of the Luftwaffe, since the Kriegsmarine was not on its own a match for it. It follows from this that the maintenance of air superiority was essential to the success of the invasion for the primary reason that, without it, the Luftwaffe could not safeguard the army’s supply lifeline from the Royal Navy.

Back on land, Halders objectives were a little simpler. The very nature of the naval situation had forced upon him a landing on a relatively narrow front. This situation had to be reversed quickly once the forces were ashore. The primary objective was to widen the bridgehead in order to prevent the British from concentrating their forces.

London, was not a primary objective. The British would be certain to defend it, and he did not have the troops available to fight street battles in London. Instead, the reverse psychology of this was that the British would ‘think’ London was a primary objective, and commit their reserves to defend it.

Halders objective was to allow the British to believe this, but push his “coup de main” rapidly westward to Southampton, then north to Oxford, in the hope of enveloping London. This fitted nicely with the need to widen and disperse the British defences.

In the air, the battle for air superiority resumed on the fourth day. RAF Fighter Command were exhausted. The losses amongst experienced pilots was now critical, but the replacement of lost aircraft was now also causing severe problems.

The landings had compelled the abandonment of several forward airfields including Manston and Hawkinge whilst Biggin Hill was within range of German artillery. During the morning, the RAF’s weary pilots and raw replacements took to the air once more in defence of their homeland and the last bastion of freedom left in Europe.

The 24th Infantry Division pushed on up the main London road from Sittingborne, and during the morning, took Gillingham and the Naval Dockyards at Chatham, which were virtually undefended, the 1st London Division having pulled back on to the high ground behind the River Medway.

The 24th paused here, awaiting supplies of ammunition and food to catch up. In the meantime, they despatched a Regiment onto the Isle of Sheppey in order to clear the coastline out to Sheerness.

In the centre, the 78th Infantry had secured Sevenoaks, allowing the exhausted 7th Para to pass through to the rear for a well earned rest. They probed British positions on the other side of the valley during the morning, but went no further. The British 45th Infantry were dug in between Caterham and Chevening, while another formation had come up on its left, from the junction of the River Dart, through Kingsdown to Meopham.

To the south of the 78th, 22nd Airlanding were extending out to fill in the gap between 4th and 8th Corps which had formed during the rush to relieve the Paras on the North Downs. They occupied East Grinstead during the morning, then, finding no British units in their van, moved forward to Crawley and then Kingsfold in the Afternoon, before fighting a brief meeting engagement with a British unit identified as the 3rd Infantry Division in the late afternoon.

58th Division tracked them on their left flank, through Haywards Heath, Cuckfield and Bolney, before encountering British defensive positions at Shipley.
8th Division fought a series of brief engagements with skillful rearguard units from 1st NZ Division, occupied Shoreham and Worthing before running into the 4th Infantry Division at Angmering.

Meanwhile, after the initial engagements, the British line was beginning to stabilise itself, as the reinforcements from V and XI Corps arrived to support the battered XII Corps.

Ironside considered his strategy aswell. For the British, containment of the invasion was crucial. But he was an accomplished military man also, and had no intention of allowing London to become a distraction. Its qualities as a defensive position were clear, but he also planned to fight the main engagement south of the capitol, on the flatter land of the West Sussex Level. And he had good reason to do so. He reasoned, correctly, that the Germans would not send their armour into an urban battle for London, but would instead try to outflank it along the south coast on ground more suitable for tanks.

And it was for this reason that he had begun to assemble his Armoured reserves, behind Haslemere in the Woolmer Forest, where it would be difficult for enemy reconnaissance to detect them.

Here, the 1st Armoured, the 2nd Armoured and the 1st Canadian Divisions were beginning to form up. The 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 42nd Infantry Division were on their way. Within the next 36 hours, he hoped to have assembled almost all of his offensive armour, around 400 AFV’s, for a counter-stroke.

A plan was forming in his mind. But first, he needed to be sure of the enemy’s intentions. It was his only real chance. If it succeeded, he could cripple the German forces on this side of the channel. If it failed, the land battle would be all but lost.

In the air over the battlefield, the pilots of both sides watched the drama being played out below with a detached interest. Upon the battle they themselves were fighting would rest the future of the one below.

The British were fighting hard. They had claimed 268 enemy aircraft destroyed in the last few days, with many more damaged. But their own losses were grievous.
119 fighters lost in four days, more damaged and, more crucially, 57 experienced pilots killed or missing. It could not go on like this for much longer.

`


Originally Registered January,2001 Member Number 3044

"Blessed are they who expect nothing, for they shall not be disappointed" - Edmond Gwenn, "The Trouble With Harry"

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