I think you misunderstood what he said. He has been consistent with his criticism of the pilots - that they didn't respond well to failures that Boeing and FAA shouldn't have allowed to happen.

You've also misunderstood what the MCAS does and how it works. It is not an issue of it being too strong. The issue is that it is able to, albeit slowly, push the nose down too far to maintain altitude. The MCAS itself does not cause stiffness in the trim, that was a result of cutting the stab trim out and resorting to manual control. Stiff manual controls and trim are not unique to the 737. It has been an issue aircraft designers have struggled with since before WW2. Look at the A6M Zero or the P-38 Lightning and the steps the designers had to take to deal with those problems. I won't blame the pilots entirely for not knowing how stiff the trim would be while flying at that speed as it may have been the first time they'd experienced it for real, but many airlines teach a procedure specifically for dealing with stuck manual trim during simulator training (Unloading the aircraft and reducing speed). Pilots who fly recreationally in relatively fast aircraft have all experienced this.

The MCAS does not put in nose down trim particularly quickly. The biggest criticism of the pilots appears to be that they allowed the trim to run away for so long without taking any steps to stop it. In the first incident, they never attempted to stop the trim physically. In fact they never took any steps to stop it at all. This is in stark contrast with the crew who on the previous day, had flown the same airplane and disabled the system immediately once they recognized a trim runaway. In the second crash, the response to the trim running away was slow, though it did occur, but then the system was re-enabled and the trim movement was STILL not stopped. It was the final re-enabling of the MCAS which sent the aircraft into the ground. If they had left it cut out the first time they probably would have had enough time to figure out a better solution.

It does not absolve Boeing of the bad design at all, but it's becoming more clear that certain elements within Boeing made it known that they felt the lack of redundancy with the MCAS was dangerous. They were silenced by management in order to ensure the MAX could be certified for flight without requiring a new type rating or additional training for pilots coming in from other 737's. FAA must have known about this and let it slide.

It's clear Boeing made a very bad decision with this. But it is a demonstrable fact that alert crews recognized MCAS / Trim runaway and responded quickly and appropriately to prevent the situation from escalating BEFORE the first crash happened. What I would like to see the media grab onto, instead of just the poor design decision, is WHY pilot training at airlines operating the type has not been consistent, and WHY pilots are flying on passenger jets without knowing how to handle runaway trim scenarios - one of the most dangerous but preventable technical failures that can occur on any aircraft. Why is it that some crews from the same airline were able to deal with it but not others? It seems to me that regulatory bodies and airline management have more to answer for than just allowing Boeing's bad design choice to make it into service. Lowest common denominator aircraft design does not cut it. Things can and will go wrong with airplanes. The crews need to be competent enough to handle problems when they crop up. One crew from the same airline on the same aircraft literally one day previous was able to handle the emergency, but not the next crew. This speaks volumes about the inconsistency of the training going on there and at other airlines.

My suggestion for airlines in developing nations is to post a third flight crew member with high flight time (In the type being flown) in the cockpit to monitor at all times if the captain has been paired with a low flight time first officer.