@Longbow,
since this is the public forum and i mean in no way to take this to PWEC, let me explain a few things. I am not into a which is better contest. Airbus has similar problems with its automation systems
Airbus Quantas and the 737 is still a very good plane. I am aware that the pilots involved in the two 737max incidents did not handle the situation well, and that others might have acted more successfully in keeping the plane from a crash. Also automation for basic tasks is a good thing and lets pilots have their head free for complicated other decisions. In this case with automatics running haywire the pilots seem to have been overstrained.
It seems though that Boeing did not communicate differences well enough to airlines and pilots. The new 737max engines changed the flight physics considerably, and since no one wanted an expensive pilot training the new Max was intended to feel and fly like the usual 737.
The new plane had different engines that caused the plane to rotate due to a shifted center under full thrust, which was intended to be counterbalanced by the MCAS.
Too 'sensational' but well explained It is stated that a 56 minute iPad "Course" was what pilots of the 737 got to fly the 'Max', and this would have been enough under normal circumstances - which a damaged aoa vane and a runaway stabilizer is not.
The two Aoa vanes are not both used by the MCAS during one flight, but are "cycled" instead. So if one vane feeds data to the computer on
one flight, it switches to the other vane in the next flight. So if the one vane fails that feeds the data
this flight, there is no redundancy for the automatic system.
The elevators were set to rotate the plane back to normal ascent in case of a too high angle of attack. The MCAS oversteered because of a faulty Aoa vane indicating a too high aoa (again, the other vane may have worked alright, but the data feed came from the damaged one).
So the engines generated full thrust and the aoa was perfectly ok. But the MCAS being fed with wrong data from a damaged vane 'thought' that the Aoa was too steep, so it actuated the elevators to lower the nose. Which lead to the plane lowering the nose and thus getting faster under still full thrust. When the pilots realized that something was wrong they switched off the MCAS and tried to manually trim the elevator back to normal - alright so far.
As tests have shown
the manual trimming was probably too slow (switch to manual at 18:50, and see what happens) to get the plane back into horizontal flight path (?). The MCAS trimming the elevator is much faster than you could do it manually, and the latter also needs a lot of strength to turn the trimming wheels, which can only be done by one pilot since the other flies the plane pulling hard. If you see how fast those wheels turn when actuated by automatic and electric engine you can see that time is crucial, and turning the trim wheel against the pressure of the forces, especially when going faster than the usual ascending speed, is almost impossible.
If the pilots had cut the thrust, the plane would have lowered the nose even more because of the trim set prior to switching to manual, while keeping up high speed for a while in then level flight. It looks like the pilots let the 'tilting up' engines run to keep the plane horizontal and counterfight the dropping nose. When this did not work they set the MCAS to on again because they could not actuate the trim fast enough and hoped for the MCAS to assist. They were not able to cope with the force acting on the elevator at that speed. Lowering the flaps to slow down was also impossible due to speed and automatics forbidding it (because of the speed).
Automation, psychology I think this is a very good video:
"It does not absolve Boeing of the bad design at all, but it's becoming more clear that certain elements within Boeing made it known that they felt the lack of redundancy with the MCAS was dangerous. They were silenced by management in order to ensure the MAX could be certified for flight without requiring a new type rating or additional training for pilots coming in from other 737's. FAA must have known about this and let it slide.
True. I still wonder what Airbus did or does after the crash in the Atlantic to prevent happening this again.
What I would like to see the media grab onto, instead of just the poor design decision, is WHY pilot training at airlines operating the type has not been consistent, and WHY pilots are flying on passenger jets without knowing how to handle runaway trim scenarios - one of the most dangerous but preventable technical failures that can occur on any aircraft. Why is it that some crews from the same airline were able to deal with it but not others? It seems to me that regulatory bodies and airline management have more to answer for than just allowing Boeing's bad design choice to make it into service. Lowest common denominator aircraft design does not cut it. Things can and will go wrong with airplanes. The crews need to be competent enough to handle problems when they crop up. One crew from the same airline on the same aircraft literally one day previous was able to handle the emergency, but not the next crew. This speaks volumes about the inconsistency of the training going on there and at other airlines.
My suggestion for airlines in developing nations is to post a third flight crew member with high flight time (In the type being flown) in the cockpit to monitor at all times if the captain has been paired with a low flight time first officer.
Amen to that!
But the media are seldomly specialists... same as politicians.
