The pilot actually enabled the autopilot, from the pilots seat which at that time was already shaking for ~30secs as a stall warning (kept shaking until the end, only the pilots, not on the fo side), but AP was turned of again 33 seconds later, iirc, whether automatically due to the divergent AoA and other sensor readings from both sides, or manually is not documented in the report. Short before the autopilot was disengaged, the crew retracted the flaps as well. With autopilot off and flaps up MCAS finally "took control", triming down from 4.6 to 2.1 5secs after the AP was disengaged (1st).
"Don't sink" warning, followed first by pulling the stick and then electric trim up to 2.4. 5secs later MCAS trims down to 0.4 (2nd).
"Don't sink" warnings again, followed by electric trim up to 2.3, and stab trim cut-out. Thus before MCAS could do its thing the third time, they already reacted.

Last edited by WhoCares; 04/09/19 09:28 AM.