Yup! These also amuse me:
1. The Polish cavalry charged German tanks in 1939!
2. Hitler wanted to conquer the entire world!
3. The tide of the war in Europe was turned after D-Day!
The "Hitler wanted to conquer the entire world" statement is not really a myth. Nazi ideology and economic plans (to the extent the latter existed) sort of assumed perpetual expansion and warfare, with intervals of "peace" that would have continued to involve constant low-level border wars and imperial policing, along the lines of how Hitler understood the history of Imperial Rome or American western expansion. While the initial phase of conquest would have stopped mostly with European Russia and whatever of the African and Middle Eastern colonies he could have gobbled up, Hitler's long term goals (in the pre-war and early war time frame) did include building a navy and air force that could threaten the United States and expansion into the Western Hemisphere by the 1950s. One can debate whether, even assuming a German victory over the Soviet Union and negotiated peace with Great Britain, Hitler's plans were realistic, and whether the German people or economy would have withstood the probably ruinous effects of even a successful execution of this Hitlarian "utopia," but the concept did exist.
I would recommend the works of Gerhard Weinberg on the subject.
The Japanese Zero and the German battleship Bismarck have had great propagandists post war that have grown their reputations to mythical proportions far beyond their actual technical abilities.
+1
Concerning the Bismarck, the Royal Navy did indeed over-react to its deployment in 1941 so it made the post war sensationalism and myth creation that much easier.
As to the Zero, it is too bad more people do not read Lundstrom's work, and realize that the USN fighter pilots were actually achieving basically even kill ratios with the A6M right off the bat. A lot of the Zero's initial success had as much or more to do with strategy and logistics (i.e. US, British, and Allied fighters deployed in small numbers and ordered to mostly conduct defensive patrols that further put them at a numerical and positional disadvantage in combat) than with the superiority of the Zero or the Japanese pilots.
I will say, I do not think, given what the British did and did not know about the
Bismarck, that they really overreacted. Unlike later on, when the RAF drove the Kriegsmarine surface force out of France to be mostly bottled up in Norway, in 1941 the French ports were still considered a major threat to the convoy routes. The Royal Navy believed they had to sink the
Bismarck while she was out, not because she was a existential threat to individual British battleships, but because if she could operate from France (and especially if
Tirpitz managed to join here there), she would force the RN to commit most of their battleship force to blocked duties and/or convoy escort, at a time when the RN was also still dealing with an active Italian navy, the possible threat of a French navy going over to the Germans, and rumblings of war in the Indian Ocean and Pacific.
Moreover, unlike the USN (who relegated their
Standard class battleships to second line duties once it became clear the IJN could not or would not seriously threaten the West Coast), the Royal Navy still depended on their WWI-era battleships for a significant portion of their naval combat power. Their slow speed allowed them to operate in convoys just fine (though there would not have been enough of them to guard every convoy and also counter the Italians), but most of them were not really suitable to the more mobile operations that would have been necessary to deal with a Bismarck, or especially a Bismarck/Tirpitz task force breaking out into the Atlantic from France. In 1941, that would have left
Hood, two
KGV-class, and two
Renown class battleships that could actually counter the
Bismark and
Tirpitz. Given that the Germans would have been able to pick the timing of any raid, and given that ships would have had to cycle in and out of port for maintenance and replenishment, and the RN had a justifiable fear that most of their available battleship strength would have been occupied countering those two German battleships.