OT: Treatment of NCO Pilots?

Rolling up pilots in the Pilot Creation Screen normally the only place I have to pause and think is my starting rank. Try to get a balance of historical accuracy and the "thrill" of tangible career progress of game promotions but it has me pondering.
How were NCO and Non-Rate pilots (and Observers) treated by the various air forces? German, French, and British? The Americans are a little easier for the pilots but what about the observers? Think most (all?) were also Officers.

For the Germans I have, interestingly, never read anything about it despite the rather large amount of literature available. I know little of the French side of things.
There is more, but slight and sometimes almost whispered, things in the RFC/RAF. Was there a force wide policy or was it kind of based on the individual units?

For example I think I have read (and I've been reading for several decades forgetting more then I currently know so forgive me) that in some Brisfit units pilots and observers all ate together. Other times I have read that Sgt pilots ate and lived with the ground personnel rarely being seen outside of the flight line by the officer gentlemen. Rank was rank for messing and quarters. Was that always the case?

Also read that, by some apparently, James McCudden (NCO pilot promoted to Major eventually based on undeniable skill and talent) was treated rather shabbily by certain other officers based on his "lowly origins." For the British overall things are often hinted, with some obvious resentment, but its seems to be all over the place and on the quiet side.

Any historians want to chime in here about the British, French, and German NCO and non-rate pilots?

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Britain was by far the most blatant about the class differences between the landed gentry and everyone else. Officers and "other ranks" were seen as separate and not equal. The RFC/RNAS is where you see this changing a bit because they allowed ORs to serve as pilots, though a lot of folks felt this was a bad idea. And yes there was resentment towards individuals like McCudden who were not of the proper class or education to be an officer. Some commanding officers took the approach that if they served together as equals in the air they should also do so on the ground, but these were the exception.

This same sort of thing existed on the German side as well, but to a somewhat lesser extent. The class system was strong there but was breaking down, and fell apart completely by the end of the war. Interestingly, one could become "landed" if it was ordered by the nobility. This is what happened in Richthofen's case when he became von Richthofen by royal decree.

The French were the most even-handed when it came to the rank differences and this is most likely due to them having thrown off the aristocracy a century before and adopting a more "we are equals" attitude.

American pilots had to be officers with almost no exceptions, which always surprised me given our own idea that all men are created equal, (of course it's been obvious from the git-go that a lot of people think some are more equal than others).

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Thanks Lou.
I suspected as much with the British though, over the years looking back on it, you wish to avoid stereotyping or disregarding things based on my modern view of things. Sounds like it may have been up to the Squadron CO...maybe. Interestingly life in the Australian Squadrons was reported to be much more “Democratic.” If that’s not a dirty word any more!

And interesting observation about the French.

I frankly expected it as much with the Germans (maybe I’ve been watching “The Blue Max” too much. ) but never have anything about their treatment of NCO pilots. Maybe it’s only officers writing the books or it was a society where it wasn’t given a second thought as it was expected. Guess I have to wonder how widespread NCO pilots were. I know early in the war, in two-seaters, an NCO pilot and Officer Observer was apparently fairly common as gentlemen didn’t “drive.” I know several of the big aces started as NCO’s. Where’s Olham when we need him?

Are there cases where a major ace did not lead the flights he participated in because of having low rank? It definitely seems that aces in most air forces had quite a lot of freedom when it comes to modifying the aircraft and going out on their own.

In most military branches the unimporance of skill and even experience compared to rank would go without saying but air war definitely seems to have been much more individualistic in all regards than other forms of warfare.

In WOFF I usually start my careers as lowest officer rank for middle tier planes and more typical chain of promotions.

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mvp7, rank and experience led the flights, out of necessity and common sense respectively. But once back on the ground even aces like McCudden were still just temporary gentlemen in the eyes of a lot of upper class folks. The term itself, "temporary gentlemen", was an open dig at them, the idea being that once the war ended these men would no longer have their commissions, which again was an honor meant only for those of proper breeding and education

Yes, air warfare was more individualistic but that did not translate to equality on the ground. While the public loved its air heroes, the class system was still very much in place when it came to how they were treated by certain people.

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Duke, you are quite right about pilots being seen as chauffeurs early on, but that changed quickly when the single seat scouts became the place to be for the daring individuals who wanted to make their mark.
And to Australia, that is another story altogether as they seemed much more even-handed in terms of the rank thing. I imagine that goes to how they started out as a country.

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In Malaula, the book of Julius Buckler, he mentioned that once he was the leading ace, but still lower rank than the others, they usually started, formed up, went towards the lines according rank etc. like they had to do according custom and protocol etc.. But at some point he "unofficially" took over the lead, until they went back again. Then the highest rank took over again. So obviously it was rather common that rank outplayed skill or killnumbers and their procedure with Buckler was highly unofficial.

Also being a high scoring ace does not necessarily mean that they were good leaders in the air and vice versa.

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Excellent points Creaghorn, thank you. I'd forgotten how that was made mention of in the Buckler account, a perfect example of how ingrained the whole idea of class was in certain countries. Given his experience, skill, and abilities Buckler should have been ranking officer.

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Fascinating. Sounds like a book to hunt down.
Did he make any mention of quarters and mess arrangements for the NCO pilot on the ground?

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Duke, I took a quick skim through my copy and a mention of interest to this point is made by Buckler on his posting at FAA 209:

"I still ran into a little bit of embarrassment when Hauptmann Funck indicated to me that I should take the seat to his right. I had in fact heard that in many an officer's mess it was custom that every new arrival was the guest of the commander on the first day. That this custom also extended to non-commissioned officers surprised me. To be sure, it was war, and we were all fighting for the Fatherland."

And not just a German thing though this may not go in the same realm as “class differences.” Or maybe it does.

Rickenbacker writes in his book that when Quentin Roosevelt (son of Teddy Roosevelt) arrived at the front as a newly minted officer and pilot the military brass insisted he be the flight leader despite all flight members (all officers) having much more experience then he.
Reportedly he did the same thing as the Buckler story. Lead on take-off then one of the more experienced flight members took over when airborne. Never led a flight till his death.

Nice find. And his reaction speaks volumes I suppose.
Sounds like he ate there as a matter of course despite it being an “Officers Mess” though I may be reading into it.
Probably much depended on the will of the Squadron CO. Course being invited to the table doesn’t mean you had your bread buttered for you either. Probably some officer pilots were very class conscious and some not I would think.
Guess we’ll leave the whole “regular” and “reserve” officer thing for another day!

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Duke, to your Rickenbacker comment, it doesn't matter which military you're in, the logic, (or lack thereof), is still the same: If you're the ranking officer you're in charge, and by default must then also know what you're doing.

To Buckler dining with the officers as a regular thing, I have seen similar indicated in other German pilot's accounts, that pilots did dine together regardless of rank or social standing. I don't know that this "equality" extended much beyond the mess hall in a lot of cases however.

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Hi all,
McCudden was to be posted as CO of No.85 Squadron in France, but the squadron officers refused to have him as their CO, partly due to his 'middle class' upbringing. He was eventually given command of No.60 Squadron, but was killed on his way to take up his post after suffering an apparent engine failure in his SE5a.

Mike

Wow! Lemme say that again. Wow!! Aaaaaand wow. Lemme get another in. Wow!
I am, even assuming a wildly rigid society, astonished as that is quite over the top. Much worse then I thought.
Now I see where the hinted resentment is coming from. Not from McCudden himself (whatever he may have thought but I can imagine) but from all that knew him and the other NCO pilots. Wow.
And the fact that it was allowed to stand, and every officer of the 85th not posted out for it, speaks loudly of the attitude of the higher ups too. I would have cleaned them out and they’d be flying Be2’s in Palestine.

What a personal affront. Especially after all that he had done not only in the air but on the ground too. Apparently he was quite the amateur aeronautics engineer also always tinkering with stuff.

Thanks though Sandbagger. From now on I start as a Sergeant when flying British.
“Not just Willy...”

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Thanks for that nugget Mike. Yup Duke, it was that bad. As further example of the class division, the excellent 1970's BBC series "Wings" had it right too. A must watch for anyone with our bent for WWI aviation. Too bad that series only lasted one season.

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I have 'Wings' series 1 and 2 on dvd mate!
The first series was shown in 1977, the second a year later in 1978... and yes, I watched them avidly at the time!

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Trooper, I have it on DVD as well. Did they really list it as two seasons? With 26 episodes I thought it was only considered as one season. I was stationed in England when it first aired and I watched 'em all. Good stuff!

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They ran from Jan to March on both years Lou... and having said that it has been years since I watched them. I think I might start to watch the whole lot again!

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Thanks for the clarification Trooper, I didn't remember it running only in the spring. That was a long time ago now, and my memory is not what it used to be, not that it was much to begin with mind you.

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I have Wings season 1 - 12 episodes and season 2 - 13 episodes

A while ago, we had a short discussion on this very topic in our current DID thread. To sum it up, NCO pilots were very common in all the air services of the Great War era, except the British (there were some) and the American (there were none).

Generally speaking, the societies of the early 20th century were frightfully class-conscious. But some countries seem to have taken it much farther than others. IMO, it's very interesting that in some ways, the British society was actually less democratic than the German one of the 1910s, although it's now very common to think of Imperial Germany as an authoritarian military society. For example, all German males could vote in elections. In Britain, it was a different matter. You could vote only if you owned a certain amount of property. It took until 1918 to change the legislation.

There was definitely plenty of hypocrisy to share between all the belligerents, when you contrast the high ideals presented in their propaganda with the actual social conditions of their peoples.

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So true Hasse, so very true. Thanks for chiming in here. And I wonder how many times over the years we've had this very discussion. It's always a lively one.

One minor correction, the Americans did have a handful of NCO pilots, but none served in combat as they were all relegated to repair squadrons.

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I stand corrected.

For learning about such details, this forum is the best (IMHO).

I was going to bring up the apparent irony, after the Buckler and McCudden stories, of the latter (certainly American) concept of class conscious, authoritarian, and rigid Germany versus our fair and freedom loving cousins the British - to paint the whole thing with a huge brush - but decided not to start potentially causing offense to someone in this day and age. Since my mother is from Germany and my fathers family Great Britain I get to play both sides of the street.
But since Hasse broke the ice...

This is a very informative thread Gents! Thanks.

Thanks. I definitely would not expect the rank and breed not to matter on the ground in an early 20th century British or German military. Even the modern armies of the most egalitarian societies rely on the inequality of ranks simply to be functional.

As a modern example, during my year of national service in the Finnish army, I saw first hand how cumbersome and volatile (although still effective) a unit progressively gets when the meaning or rank and organization erodes among the conscripted over the year. As orders become less absolute, effective leadership becomes increasingly reliant on social skills of the leaders. The chain of command and limits of each individual's authority become increasingly smudged as skill and personality of the personnel shift the on-paper organization of the unit.

Of course that mainly concerns the internal hierarchy of conscripted reserve part of the army (which in practice means all the personnel and wartime leaders up to platoon or even company level). The professional part of the army (which consists of the professional under-officers and officers) maintains the organization more strictly and there's no question about their authority over the conscripted.

There still are some exceptions though. All young (professional) officers acknowledge and use the experience of older (professional) under-officers and ask rather than formally order them to do things. Some commissioned specialists like engineer-officers with minimal military training tend to get very or even completely informal with their (few) conscripted underlings. In serious situations the formal part of the hierarchy usually diminishes. e.g. In Finnish UN peacekeeping units the personnel (volunteers, mostly from among the conscripted) and officers (professionals) can even be on first name basis.

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It's especially the practical combat arrangements, like the peculiar case of J. Buckler that Creaghorn mentioned, that interest me the most. That kind of overriding of the rank and chain of command can easily and irreversibly erode the authority and credibility of the yielding leader in the eyes of his subordinates. No matter how practical the reasons for the exceptions were, even a minor doubt about the absoluteness of the authority can be debilitating when a leader is ordering a subordinate to risk his life.

In most service branches the benefits of clear and absolute command hierarchy will far outweigh the benefits of some "common sense" deviations that undermine the order of things. Generally (not counting generals) any one man does not make a difference in a war and the overall smooth function of the war machine is what's truly important.

From individual's point of view, there is no common sense in going over the top or up to the sky in a desperate attempt to get temporary control over a bit more mud and dirt in war to decide which of the inbred nobles get the formal domain over certain parts of Europe. From military point of view, individual's common sense is something to be mercilessly strangled with military hierarchy then wrapped in a shroud of patriotism and buried under six feet of honor and duty.

Common sense is definitely not a word often associated with most military decisions in WW1 but with air war it seems to have been more prevalent. Maybe the relatively small size of the flying element of air units meant there were so few moving parts that the organization could afford not to be a perfectly tuned machine with standardized parts. There were also undoubtedly far more one-man-armies among the pilots than there are in the ranks of any other service branch. For example Kurt Wolff is not that famous ace but he's still credited with shooting down 22 planes during Bloody April. If those were all British then he was responsible for about 9% of the total of 245 RFC planes shot down during that month. There's of course also the fact that air war was breaking new ground at the time so any experience and innovation was valued and more easily accepted than it would have been in well established military branches.

While doing a bit of searching on the HA’s in my new DID Jasta, I came across this bit of info on Carl Holler. When his Jasta was attached to the command of Boelcke “he was much happier, as Boelcke allowed all pilots in the mess and downplayed rank.” This confirms what the scholars here have said.

yeah, I guess the Brits were pretty bad about class distinctions in WWI... but it seems like they're still better than Japan in WW2! I mean, if somebody had done what Saburo Sakai had done for the RFC during WWI they would have probably made him a squadron commander. the RFC still respected results enough to let guys like McCudden have a go at it.

And then not to do anything when one of their own squadrons tells this decorated hero, appointed by them to lead said Squadron because of unquestioned ability, to drop dead?
I must strongly disagree.

In Australia we are very intolerant of people who "put on airs". Tall poppies get cut down to size very quickly here so it would make sense to me that our units were more "democratic" for cultural reasons. Probably partly to colonial heritage but also because Australia was a very unforgiving place back in those days. Being a pompous idiot and not listening to reason and experience in an environment where you can walk for days without finding water... well you can see how that would end.

What we should all remember is that times were different then... we are looking at things with our modern heads on and thinking 'oh, how unfair and , how terrible' which it was of course.
Also remember, there was still a very Victorian attitude in Britain, where everyone had their place, and not only that, people knew their place too...

That is understood. This wasn’t a case of not being invited to afternoon tea.
To me it’s essentially a mutiny - and I don’t use that word lightly - far outstripping a “you have the wrong school tie” thing.
As disappointed as I am with the officers of the 85th I am more disappointed in the reaction (or more correctly apparently a non-reaction) of RAF command.

I am keeping in mind though I lack details of the before, during, and aftermath of this sordid affair. I’m sure the event was not talked about outside of people in the know in the air service. I hardly think they would dare leak it out for general consumption even back then.

An interesting conversation indeed. I think it would be good to know on what basis the members of 85 squadron rejected (or should that be objected) to James McCudden becoming the CO. Was it based on their perceived concern as to leadership skills, or that they considered him an 'oik' and not worthy. Either way that nothing was done by the 'higher ups' suggests connivance on their part or at least a lack of leadership themselves, in that they allowed a load of Pilot Officers and Lieutenants to decide who will or won't lead them.

Let's not delude ourselves though that this is something that stopped happening 100 years ago, it's happening still, in just about every facet of life. Look at who gets in to Oxford and Cambridge (no matter what 'Stormzy' might try and do otherwise), or who gets into Sandhurst. It's not impossible for the lower classes to get in, but having attended public school clearly gives you an advantage for no tangible reason at all.

That someone's upbringing and social standing should play any part in deciding their worthiness for a particular role is abhorrent but is the basis of the pyramid class system we continue to live in.

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Word.

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Perhaps I'm just old-fashioned, but I think we are in danger of bringing a 21st-century sensibility to the dawn of the 20th century. I think we have to consider the class distinctions of the First World War in terms of intimate solitudes. This was a time when one of the better career options for working-class men and women was to be "in service." Let's examine that dynamic because it sheds some light on the officer-NCO relationship as it evolved in the British Army.

Imagine yourself as the head of the household with several servants. While far from a universal sentiment, the middle to upper classes, had a sense of "noblesse oblige." The done thing was to treat one servants with a mixture of decency and firmness. Being overly familiar was an invitation to disrespect and embarrassment. The families who employed servants were not ogres, nor were they fools (in many cases, by the late 19th century the employing family was upwardly mobile and only a generation or two removed from being in service themselves). From time to time, they could share a friendly word or a personal insight with a household servant. But they always knew that if one "crossed the line," they would be the subject of whispers below stairs and their authority in the household would be eroded.

Now, imagine yourself as a servant in that same household. Among the household staff (if the household was wealthy enough to have more than one servant), there was a pecking order. Even downstairs, "class distinctions" applied. There was pride in one's trade. And in many cases, there was a genuine loyalty towards the family that one served.

This same dynamic has long carried into the British Army. Officers and NCOs generally work well together, but there is the same familiar distance between them. Class barriers have certainly broken down in the last 70 years, but the intimate solitudes of the 19th-century household survive in the traditions of the officers' mess and the sergeants' and warrant officers' mess. When it comes to dining arrangements, an officer knows that the sergeants' mess is their holy ground and may be entered only by invitation (unless one is the orderly officer on duty). The senior NCOs must have the freedom to talk openly there and to be able to discuss their officers without fear of repercussion. The officers must have the confidence in their sergeants major to know that lines will not be crossed.

Any good officer should have the greatest of respect for the veteran NCO, and should seek his advice openly. Any good NCO should realise that the officer bears accountabilities greater than his own, but that both the officer and the men under that NCO require that the NCO provide solid and respectful advice and technical expertise. It is very easy to mess up this relationship, but when it is well established. It is a wonderful thing in practice. In reading about the RFC in the First World War, you see this relationship often when pilots write about their maintenance crew or when the members of the maintenance crew speak of their pilots.

When this system was exported to France with the RFC there were consequences that had not been anticipated. Sergeant pilots naturally messed with their fellow senior NCOs. But those senior NCOs were by and large skilled tradesmen employed as mechanics, riggers, et cetera. The poor NCO pilots had few if any peers with whom they could share their experiences in the air. To the officers, inviting the NCO pilots into the officers mess would be an unthinkable crossing of the line. Nothing in the normal dynamics of Army life anticipated this problem. The solution ultimately was to minimise the number of NCO pilots in combat squadrons. I believe that the idea that the officers looked down on NCO pilots as pilots is generally wrong. But they could not abandon their upbringing enough to disregard rank. And while NCO pilots may have bemoaned the lack of company in the sergeants' mess, I have never read of a British NCO pilot expecting or wanting to dine in the officers' mess. That would have been "not on."

Is this a class problem? Yes, but not exclusively.

As for the refusal by pilots of 85 Squadron to accept McCudden as their CO, I do not see this as a comment on McCudden's social standing. McCudden was well-known to be a solo act. The men of 85 Squadron needed and wanted a true leader. In the end, they chose Mannock – despite being born in barracks and a vocal socialist. It is clear that Mannock's reputation as a leader and as a developer of competent pilots motivated their choice. Perhaps the Old Etonians would have little desire to talk politics with Mannock over a drink, but they knew he was the man to bring them success and keep them alive.

The role played by military life in changing the social structures within the United Kingdom is a fascinating tale. We should not reduce it to a 21st-century cartoon image of posh officers looking down their noses at competent NCOs. Ironically, some of the most stuck-up officers I have read about were those in higher commands in the USAS.

I must say I feel like a fire-eating anarchist in this thread.
Most amusing.

I say, Duke - one must choose the correct wine before eating the rich!

This paragraph struck me as odd so I did some checking to get dates and you may make of it what you will.
First though McCudden was renowned and revered as a Flight Leader during his time with 56. Going by memory his Flight had the most confirmed victories and the fewest losses in the Squadron under his leadership.
I’m not sure where the “solo act” thing is coming from. If you are referring to his solo flights to destroy high flying German two-seaters that was a mission given 56 by HQ mainly, I think, because of the high skill level of 56 and the Se5. Other pilots in 56 were assigned to these solo jobs also. He was just, by far, the most successful at it (and volunteered for them when not flying with his flight) due to a combination of skill and mechanical aptitude. As far as I am aware he was not the Albert Ball type flying over the lines on his own. If you have information otherwise I’d be curious.

The above is from memory. Now the dates I looked up.
85 went to France in May 1918 under the command of Major William Bishop who was the biggest soloist in the history of the RFC. Mannock (McCudden?) was ordered to take over from Bishop who had claimed 25 victories (IIRC) in a month and did so on 18 June 1918. At this time McCudden was an instructor in England. McCudden did receive orders for 60 Squadron and died 9 July while in route there. In casual checking I can find no reference of McCudden and 85 but I will look as time permits.

Duke,

My comment was from memory, but I had to hit the books and find out what I was thinking of. I found the following...

Mac Grider, an American in 85, wrote in his diary: "The General came over and had tea with us and asked us who we wanted for CO. He wanted to send us McCudden but we don’t want him. He gets Huns himself but he doesn’t give anybody else a chance at them.… We asked for Micky Mannock who is a flight commander in 74. He’s got around sixty Huns and was at London Colney when we were, in January. He wanted to take the three of us out with him in February but we weren’t thru at Turnberry. They say that he’s the best patrol leader at the front — plans his squadron shows a day in advance and rehearses them on the ground. He plans every manoeuvre like a chess player and has every man at a certain place at a certain time to do a certain thing, and raises merry hell if anyone falls down on his job."

Odd, given that Grider got along with his old boss -- the ultimate "solo act," Bishop -- and Grider was probably unfair to McCudden. But that's what I was thinking of. My point was that they didn't seem to turn McCudden down because of his social status - his background and Mannock's were pretty much identical.

Nice find with the Grider quote.
From the sounds of it it all *sounds* like a quite casual conversation not a conspiracy. Does he give a date for this conversation? And what reason did Grider give for Bishop being replaced after a month? I can guess but back to the subject at hand:

85 needs new CO. Bishop leaving after a month. Story there which leads to...
The General stopping by the mess for tea. Talks to pilots.
“You lads need a new boss. Any ideas? Who would you like? I was thinking about Major McCudden. Fine chap. He’s available in England.”
85: “Thanks General but....”

McCudden - and anyone else outside the mess that day - may never have been aware of the conversation. One that we all have participated in at one time or another.
McCudden and Mannock were reported to be “friends” from training days FWIW.

Now I agree that Griders reasoning for not wanting McCudden is blatantly ridiculous. Not to say he really didn’t think that but if so why? And is that the real reason? Social class? Grider is American. Sounds like Grider (and other members of the 85) knew Mannock personally and liked him.

And there is a slight difference between McCudden and Mannock. While “socially” they did have very similar backgrounds (almost exact actually) Mannock entered the RAF as a Lieutenant (kind of) while McCudden was “up from the ranks.” This apparently did matter to some English officers. But, again, why would this matter a whit to an American like Grider?

The mystery continues!

I'm surprised it got recorded like this at all. Generally conversations like this wouldn't be disclosed so explicitly by veterans, since it's considered bad form to make remarks about fellow service members that might be construed as derogatory.

It’s one man’s recollection of events after the fact. Or was it a diary of sorts.
Mannock and McCudden are both dead.
Granted it’s his opinion and memory but I don’t find it odd nor particularly derogatory just not factually correct as I understand it. Who knows what Grider may have heard from others in the small and insular world of the RFC/RAF.

McCudden was apparently aware of some of this and downplayed his VC award I have heard. The British, generally, were reluctant to make a big deal of the aces at the expense of others. He was somewhat of a sudden hero thrust upon the public by a newspaper campaign (Daily Mail?). Was his VC (though certainly deserved) a result of that campaign?
I believe others thought so (and he may have also a bit and certainly aware of the effect on others apparently) so that, combined with his “lowly origins” in a class conscious society (and Officer Corps) would naturally inspire jealousy/envy in others which leads to “negative talk” in various Squadron Messes on a long winters night. We’ve all been there and seen how things get spread around. Any ex-military here? “Oh yes, well I’ve heard...”

FWIW I have always heard (how true I’ll leave to others) that higher HQ thought highly of McCudden for his leadership, ability, and contribution to the science of aircraft flight in a practical sense. What some thought of him as a Major and VC winner I can’t say.

Duke,

It was Grider's contemporary diary. Grider was killed not much later. According to Grider, the opinion was generally held by the pilots of 85. Personally, it's an opinion with which I disagree. McCudden seems to have been well-respected as a leader.

I am familiar with Grider as a “friend of aces” and as his diary (which I shall certainly have to get a copy of) is constantly quoted. I’m sure I knew he was killed at one time but had forgotten that till you reminded me.
And that fact tends, to me, to give his observations and opinions a bit more veracity in that he wasn’t “fluffing” for a post war audience nor did he presumably have some axe to grind for some later offense.
What is the name of his book/diary?

This McCudden-Mannoc case is pretty interesting. There are couple things I think are worth considering.

Career officers have received full officer training while officers promoted from ranks during wartime often have not. Even if one is great pilot and good tactician that doesn't automatically make him the best leader for a unit. As romantic as it is to think that every officer promoted from the ranks was an incredible leader fighting the man, that's not necessarily the case. More than anything the wartime promotions are a temporary measure to replace the losses of officer cadre with at least somewhat capable people.

The opinion of superiors, peers and subordinates of any soldier/person can be very different. McCudden was loved by the generals because of his achievements alone but that does not mean his peers and subordinates shared the feeling. Whether that's due to simple envy or other things is another question.

Around the time I'd think the 85 squadron's leader was discussed, McCudden had apparently just been sent back to England due to combat fatigue. Here's a quite from Wikipedia:


Reading that, Grider's impression of the man doesn't seem too inaccurate. Even if he had been a careful tactician in the past, the people close to him would remember him as he was when they parted. In the end, it's the current capability of the man that really matters on the front, not past glories and contributions. Overall, Mannock simply seems better leader option at the time than McCudden. There's also the possibility that McCudden was suggested for the post in the first place because of his good relations with the generals, the whole thing kinda turns upside down .

I am not disregarding Mannock as a leader but he had no more (and probably less) “Officer Training” then McCudden. Not that it necessarily equated “Good Officer = Good Squadron CO” who were not expected to fly. The “debate” was not who is better (though that may make a interesting, but impossible, discussion) but why 85 acted the way they did - and what that “way” is is now more cloudy then ever.

For me, as of right this second, I’m going with multiple officers knowing Mannock personally as the main reason followed by a distant number two of simple negative service talk about McCudden rooted in jealousy and “class struggles” all followed up by a casual talk with a General over tea in the mess who asked a question and not some rebellion. Only they know for sure and they are all long dead.

McCudden was promoted to officer during his flying career on the front. Mannock entered Engineering Corps as a cadet and was promoted to officer before moving to flying school. Mannock definitely had more officer training.

A hero being held down by jealousy and class struggle is definitely more dramatic 21st century narrative than a more qualified commander being picked over a propaganda star obsessed with his personal score. The truth is probably somewhere in between the two extremes.

Guess the only thing left for me is why the General stopped by.
Don’t recall a Squadron ever being consulted as to who they want for a CO.
Circumstances following the strange tenure of Bishop or was McCudden really chosen first which led to grumbling at 85? Who knows?



That’s a leap. And hardly so dramatic.

And the Engineering Corp (which may not be what you think it is for “Officer Training”) was not Manocks first stop. He left both with short stays before ending up in the RFC.
And since this is apparently turning into a “Mannock vs McCudden” debate McCudden has much more military experience.

But we are wide of the point of the thread at this stage. I have an answer for the 85 thing for now (and more questions) so we’ll let it lay.

What do you mean by leap? I don't think I have claimed anything that outrageous. McCudden's obsession with beating Red Baron's kill count is well known and hardly something you would wan't from a man responsible for the entire squadron.

McCudden had been in service and in the air service longer than Mannock but Mannock had been officer for longer and entered air service as an officer. Total duration of service does not override the meaning of rank as enlisted, NCOs and officers all have different roles and responsibilities. McCuddens years as a mechanic, observer and pilot don't automatically make him more qualified officer or commander than Mannock.

The point is not which of the two was really better, I just don't see any reason why Mannock couldn't simply have been requested because he was deemed better squadron commander than McCudden (based on what the pilots of No.85 knew of the two). Grider's diary seems to support this as well, rather than plain jealousy and class.

What exactly makes you leap into the conclusion that McCudden was a victim of something?

To answer Duke's question, I found the quote from Mac Grider in "The Making of Billy Bishop" by Brereton Greenhous. On further examination, Greenhous clearly took it word for word from "Warbirds – The Diary of an Unknown Aviator" by Elliott White Springs. Springs published Mac Grider's diary under that title.

Interestingly, in "The Courage of the Early Morning" by William Arthur Bishop, Billy's son, I found the following passage:

"A rumour circulated through the squadron that McCudden was being considered as Bishop's successor – and McCudden had a reputation for being not only an exceptional pilot, but very discipline-minded and 'regimental.' The Flying Foxes were an easy-going crew, and they feared there would be friction. Bishop's own choice was the slender Irishman he had met with Grid Caldwell – Mick Mannock of 74 Squadron. He was a superb aerial tactician who would probably be popular with the Foxes – and all hands were delighted when Bishop's recommendation was accepted by headquarters."

So here we have Bishop's son, claiming that it was Bishop's own suggestion that Mannock be his successor. Bishop had indeed expressed admiration for Mannock. He wrote his fiancée, Margaret Burdon, "Mannock now has more than 30 Huns. He is a marvel from all accounts. I'm always glad when a man like Mannock does so well. He is such a good fellow, and everyone likes him so much."I believe Bishop saw McCudden as a closer rival than Mannock. Mannock was less likely to challenge Bishop's record (Bishop inflated his claims, McCudden reported his claims accurately, and Mannock deflated his claims). Strangely, Bishop attributes his preference to McCudden's attention to discipline (as opposed to Grider's suggestion that McCudden was too focused on his own score). Yet Mannock could be equally harsh with a pilot who did not follow instructions.

I have an evil hunch that Bishop was a classic narcissist and, as narcissists are prone to do, projected his own weakness (i.e. focus on personal score over leadership) onto McCudden when speaking with his men at 85. There is a lot at play here, and much more than any simple notion of class distinction.

Hmmm. I feel like you have read nothing I wrote mvp7.
The limitation of the texted word typed into my little phone screen in between silly RL stuff. I’m not trying to change anyone’s mind here nor am I carrying the torch for McCudden. You see things one way and I another. I have what I needed and know what I know - unfortunately based on 3rd hand Information 100 years old in a lot of cases - but there it is.

Excellent! Thank you. Clearly I need more additions to the library.
Thanks for taking the time to post that.

EDIT: Actually I have about 150 WW1 aviation books in electronic format that I just remembered. Oops.
That title sounds familiar. Wonder if that’s one of them. Got them saved for when I buy a Kindle - which I haven’t got around to in about 6 years.

I have read what you have written Duke (although I did not see your edits before posting). I'm not trying to extinguish McCudden's torch either. I'm simply proposing another possible explanation to his missed command. I never claimed that my theory was correct and your's wrong, they are merely theories to be debated. I don't think anyone living can claim to know the truth of the matter and even the dead people involved would all have very different opinions of it.

Truth is usually somewhere in the middle of the extremes and Raine's interesting quote seems to point that way: Squadron 85's opinions of the two men might have been biased due to Bishop's personal feelings but in the end it was the Mannock's alleged qualities as an officer that lead to the squadron asking for him rather than McCudden's background being the issue (although it could be a part of it at least on subconscious level).

All good.
I do, unfortunately, a lot of editing due to typing with big he-man thumbs and only being able to see a couple lines at a time then ofttimes forgetting where I was going with the thought. And Autocorrect, despite its title, is not my friend.
Aaaand. Edited for grammar!

.

This has been a super discussion of the McCudden v. Mannock CO debate. Well done gents. A bit OT, but still well done.

.

Even further off topic I found myself in a squadron entirely populated by SGT's when I turned off "Historical Aces". There was only one LT in the whole outfit. Must have been lonely in the officer's mess and quite surprising for 1916. Turning HA's back on distributed the ranks more credibly. The French and German services seem to have been more or less indifferent to putting NCO's in the cockpit. The German approach was amusing since they originally had the officer as the observer under the presumption that he would "captain" the aircraft and the NCO would be responsible for the lowly mechanical task of actually driving it. This system always reminds me of that old movie "Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines". I can't imagine that their social protocols were wildly different from the British system since class segregation was certainly present there. I imagine that the Republican French were more egalitarian.

I’d be interested in the numbers of NCO pilots by year and by nation plus what type of units they were in.
Seems early war the NCO pilots were heavy in two-seater squadrons. Don’t know if that’s a left over from the “chauffeur” days or officers were clamoring for the single-seater spots.

Did read very recently that the RFC had 170 NCO pilots but I already forget where I read it or the time period. Lemme look again. I will guess that by 1918 the NCO Pilot was a bit of a rarity in the RAF.

Little tidbit about Mannock. Stumbled across this while gadding about. The author generally claims that (with quotes from Mannock’s contemporaries) the blood thirsty persona often attached to “Mick” was an act to motivate the new flyers. Normally, with just cause, you can take anything you find on the internet with a huge grain of salt but the author here is quoting known named sources. The Jones mentioned here is the famous flyer Ira “Taffy” Jones (who reportedly hated William Bishop and started the “73” victories for Mannock - one more then Bishop) and Jim Eyles who, if you are not familiar with the Mannock story, was a family he lived with in his youth.

“On May 21, Mannock brought down four German planes—three Pfalz D.IIIs and a Hannover two-seater—and the next day was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. Before the month was out, he flamed eight new victims. After such victories, he would burst into the mess shouting, “Sizzle, sizzle, sizzle, wonk woof!” to boost morale. But privately he expressed darker thoughts. By the middle of June, Jones noticed that Mannock’s nerves were “noticeably fraying. He was now continually talking about being shot down in flames.” Writing to his sister, Mannock said, “I am supposed to be going on leave, (if I live long enough)….” He was fighting depression and plagued by dreams of burning aircraft.

On June 18, Mannock sailed home for leave in England. Upon his arrival he was informed that he had been promoted to major and given command of No. 85 Squadron, previously led by Canadian ace Major William A. “Billy” Bishop, and that he also had been awarded a Bar to his DSO. He reacted with indifference to the news.

After spending a brief but painful time with his mother, an alcoholic, Mannock went to stay with his friend Jim Eyles, who saw that he “had changed dramatically. Gone was the old sparkle we knew so well; gone was the incessant wit. I could see him wring his hands together to conceal the shaking and twitching.” One day, as the time approached for Mannock to return to the war, “he started to tremble violently. This grew into a convulsive straining. He cried uncontrollably….His face, when he lifted it, was a terrible sight. Saliva and tears were running down his face; he couldn’t stop it.” Given his condition, 31-year-old Mannock should never have been sent back to the front. But back he went.”

Poor Mick. Goes home on leave in a apparently exhausted state for a rest but has to turn around almost immediately and head back to France to take over 85 where he lasted a month.

EDIT: Guess I could link the whole article eh?
https://www.historynet.com/edward-mick-mannock-world-war-i-raf-ace-pilot.htm

https://www.historynet.com/james-mccudden-perfect-soldier.htm

And one about McCudden from the same source. The same author of both articles is apparently taking excerpts from books on the two men.

For this thread note the several references to McCudden’s “working class background” and it’s apparent effect.