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Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP)

Posted By: Wolfhound

Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 07:04 AM

This is the thread to discuss Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) formally known as Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), Electronic Protection (EP) formally known as Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) as well the theory and real world effectiveness/manifestation of the various techniques.
Posted By: Wolfhound

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 07:08 AM

Regarding EA & EP techniques solely in the radar spectrum, I wonder, how fluid is this tactical game between the two protagonists? In a dogfight for instance between two aircraft the situation is very dynamic, with move and counter move played out in quick succession.

With EW the following questions arise:

1) If my radar is being jammed or deceived (ignoring using other none radar methods of target tracking) what can be done, is a radar able to solve some of these problems or is it game over?

2) No radar is impervious to being jammed or deceived, if I discover during conflict that my opposition is exploiting weaknesses with characteristics of my radar, would this usually result in a hardware upgrade (e.g new antenna), software upgrade, both or it depends on techniques against me being used?

3) Assuming my radar is susceptible to velocity deception jamming from a particular aircraft, will that aircraft always enjoy a specific and fix probability of success against me or are there other variables at work meaning that sometimes its jamming/deceiving will not always be as effective?
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 11:30 AM

Nice idea for a thread. I wish I knew more about the details behind various ECM and ECCM techniques.

Two videos that show the effect of jamming on the SA-3, and an upgraded SA-3.




Pretty cool to see what range-gate pulloff looks like to the radar operator. You can also see the slightly varying PRF to make jamming more difficult. Look at the tops of the radar displays, you can see the varying pulse rate.
Posted By: Wolfhound

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 01:30 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
Nice idea for a thread. I wish I knew more about the details behind various ECM and ECCM techniques.

Two videos that show the effect of jamming on the SA-3, and an upgraded SA-3.

Pretty cool to see what range-gate pulloff looks like to the radar operator. You can also see the slightly varying PRF to make jamming more difficult. Look at the tops of the radar displays, you can see the varying pulse rate.


Fantastic videos, thanks for posting them Mdore. thumbsup
I'll admit that I don't understand a few things going on there but it was great to see the system in action.
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 05:55 PM

Originally Posted By: Wolfhound
Regarding EA & EP techniques solely in the radar spectrum, I wonder, how fluid is this tactical game between the two protagonists? In a dogfight for instance between two aircraft the situation is very dynamic, with move and counter move played out in quick succession.

With EW the following questions arise:

1) If my radar is being jammed or deceived (ignoring using other none radar methods of target tracking) what can be done, is a radar able to solve some of these problems or is it game over?

2) No radar is impervious to being jammed or deceived, if I discover during conflict that my opposition is exploiting weaknesses with characteristics of my radar, would this usually result in a hardware upgrade (e.g new antenna), software upgrade, both or it depends on techniques against me being used?

3) Assuming my radar is susceptible to velocity deception jamming from a particular aircraft, will that aircraft always enjoy a specific and fix probability of success against me or are there other variables at work meaning that sometimes its jamming/deceiving will not always be as effective?


There are several Jamming methods.
Some are effective against one type of radar system, while can be totally ineffective (even counter productive) against other SAM types.

The effectiveness of a Jamming method are depending on several factors including, Jammer plane aspect, Jammer/Radar operator proficiency, Jammer distance, etc...

There is no "Magic" jamming method, that could negate all SAM types.

Publicly available books are good references on this topic...
"Essentials of Electronic Warfare Book" is quite good,

also
"The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare Vol III"

is nice.

In this topic we will discuss some of the following techniques...

Denial Jamming:
- Barrage Noise Jamming
- Spot Noise Jamming
- Swept Spot Noise Jamming
- Cover Pulse Noise Jamming
- Modulated Noise Jamming

Deceptive Jamming:
- False Target Jamming
- Range Deception Jamming (Range Gate Pull Off)
- Angle Deception Jamming (Inverse Amplitude Modulation, Inverse Gain Jamming, Swept Square Wave
- Velocity Deception Jamming (Velocity Gate Pull Off, Doppler Noise, Narrow-band Doppler Noise, Doppler False Targets)
- Mono-pulse Deception Jamming (Cross Polarization Jamming, Cross Eye Jamming)


... and their effect of the systems depicted in the SAMSIM.
(In the future, it is a possible development direction, to add these advanced jamming methods into SAMSIM)
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/14/13 06:12 PM

Originally Posted By: Wolfhound

I'll admit that I don't understand a few things going on there but it was great to see the system in action.


So why you don't asking? wink
Posted By: Wolfhound

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/15/13 12:57 PM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp
Originally Posted By: Wolfhound
Regarding EA & EP techniques solely in the radar spectrum, I wonder, how fluid is this tactical game between the two protagonists? In a dogfight for instance between two aircraft the situation is very dynamic, with move and counter move played out in quick succession.

With EW the following questions arise:

1) If my radar is being jammed or deceived (ignoring using other none radar methods of target tracking) what can be done, is a radar able to solve some of these problems or is it game over?

2) No radar is impervious to being jammed or deceived, if I discover during conflict that my opposition is exploiting weaknesses with characteristics of my radar, would this usually result in a hardware upgrade (e.g new antenna), software upgrade, both or it depends on techniques against me being used?

3) Assuming my radar is susceptible to velocity deception jamming from a particular aircraft, will that aircraft always enjoy a specific and fix probability of success against me or are there other variables at work meaning that sometimes its jamming/deceiving will not always be as effective?


There are several Jamming methods.
Some are effective against one type of radar system, while can be totally ineffective (even counter productive) against other SAM types.

The effectiveness of a Jamming method are depending on several factors including, Jammer plane aspect, Jammer/Radar operator proficiency, Jammer distance, etc...

There is no "Magic" jamming method, that could negate all SAM types.

Publicly available books are good references on this topic...
"Essentials of Electronic Warfare Book" is quite good,

also
"The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare Vol III"

is nice.

In this topic we will discuss some of the following techniques...

Denial Jamming:
- Barrage Noise Jamming
- Spot Noise Jamming
- Swept Spot Noise Jamming
- Cover Pulse Noise Jamming
- Modulated Noise Jamming

Deceptive Jamming:
- False Target Jamming
- Range Deception Jamming (Range Gate Pull Off)
- Angle Deception Jamming (Inverse Amplitude Modulation, Inverse Gain Jamming, Swept Square Wave
- Velocity Deception Jamming (Velocity Gate Pull Off, Doppler Noise, Narrow-band Doppler Noise, Doppler False Targets)
- Mono-pulse Deception Jamming (Cross Polarization Jamming, Cross Eye Jamming)


... and their effect of the systems depicted in the SAMSIM.
(In the future, it is a possible development direction, to add these advanced jamming methods into SAMSIM)

Ok, thanks. I'll look into getting those books you mentioned. I currently have EW 101: A First Course In Electronic Warfare so will have a look through that book also.
Posted By: Wolfhound

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/15/13 02:35 PM

Originally Posted By: piston79
Originally Posted By: Wolfhound

I'll admit that I don't understand a few things going on there but it was great to see the system in action.


So why you don't asking? wink

Here goes then:

In the second video what was the Range Gate Pull Off impact, did it effect target tracking?
What is target 'Coherent Accumulator' & 'Wobble' modes?

I think it's perhaps time for me to dive into SAMSIM to get a better understanding. The Dvina is best for beginners right?
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/15/13 06:42 PM

Originally Posted By: Wolfhound
...Here goes then:

In the second video what was the Range Gate Pull Off impact, did it effect target tracking?
What is target 'Coherent Accumulator' & 'Wobble' modes?


First, I am not a specialist, but I'll try...

Gate Pull Off:





On first one the real target was marked, on second - gate pull off efect... If "Pechora" goes for the bite, range boresight must go with the pull off (on the video you will see the left indicator that range doesn't change according the jaming efect..

On the second one - not sure but "Wobble" must reveal the false target (when jamming generates a lot false target in the boresight... don't know the english word for this jamming)..
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-1 - 02/15/13 08:28 PM

As I promised, I will start a series from the available public sources, describing the development and methods of the EW (Electronic Warfare). We will concentrate on the EW against SAM systems available in the SAMSIM.

The first step is to understand the NATO frequency band allocation table:

Name, frequency wavelength SAM system component

A band 100..250MHz 3m..1.2m P12 (metric), P18 (metric), P14 (metric)
B band 250..500MHz 1.2m..0.6m
C band 500..1000MHz 60cm..30cm P15 (decimeter)
D band 1..2GHz 30cm..15cm
E band 2..3GHz 15cm..10cm SA1 (10cm), SA2A/B/F (10cm), SOC (10cm), SON4, SON9
F band 3..4GHz 10cm..7.5cm
G band 4..6GHz 7.5cm..5cm SA2C/E (6cm)
H band 6..8GHz 5cm..3.75cm SA4 (4cm), SA5 (4.5cm CW)
I band 8..10GHz 3.75cm..3cm SA3 (3cm), RPK-1
J band 10..20GHz 3cm..1.5cm ZSU-23-4 (2cm)
K band 20..40GHz 1.5cm..7.5mm
L band 40..60GHz 7.5mm..5mm
M band 60..100GHz 5mm..3mm

Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-2 - 02/15/13 09:51 PM

On 25 July 1965 an RB-66C ELINT aircraft monitoring the EOB (Electronic Order of Battle) of North Vietnam, located the following equipment...

Fire Control Radars
1 SCR-584
1 SON-4
21 SON-9
1 Fan Song

... thus the real Electronic Warfare battle started.

During the World War-II, US supplied some SCR-584 (10cm wavelength, E band) Conical Scanning AAA Fire Control radars to the Soviet Union.


The Soviet Union copied it under the SON-4 designation.


Its further developed and exported version, the SON-9 still kept the original EW properties (10cm wavelength, E band, Conical Scan).
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-3 - 02/16/13 08:36 AM

The SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2B/F) system used in North Vietnam had several components.

P-12 (Spoon Rest-A) target acquisition radar used the A band (VHF, metric wavelength).


RSNA-75M (Fan Song F) fire control radar used the same E band (10cm wavelength) as the AAA fire control radars, but it had a TWS (Track While Scan) target tracking method, using two separate antenna, that use two separate frequency.
It means from EW point of view, that you need to jam both flapping antenna beam at the same time.
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-4 - 02/16/13 09:48 AM

US aviation services (TAC, SAC, NAVY) used different ECM systems, with different methods.

TAC (Tactical Air Command) choice was the QRC-160-1 jamming pod.
It worked in the E band, and had four voltage tuned magnetron each delivering 100W frequency modulated continuous wave noise jamming. The propeller at the nose of the pod is a RAM air turbine, generating energy for its operation.
Its jamming frequency range was preset on the ground, the pilot had only an On/Off switch.


The Barrage Noise Jamming of the pod was used to deny the plane distance from the radar, while in angles (elevation, azimuth) it was still perfectly track able.

This method was perfectly working against the SON4/9 AAA fire control radar.
Without range information, they were unable to calculate the required firing lead angle.


Against the SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2B/F) this noise jamming created a vertical band on the screens.
The plane was trackable, missiles could be guided against it with T/T method, using 11sec (arm after launch) radio proxy fuse setting.


The TAC planes (F-105, F-4) used closed "jamming pod" flying formation to merge the vertical bands (of the separate planes) on the Dvina operator screen, to create one wide band, thus making precise angle tracking impossible.
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-5 - 02/16/13 11:29 AM

Instead of a jamming pod occupying weapon stations, the NAVY selected the AN/ALQ-51 Angle Deception Jamming system, that could be built into the already crowded airframe of the A-4, A-6, F-4, and F-8 planes.
This choice is limited the equipment electrical consumption, and the available space it could occupy.
It consisted of two suitcase sized boxes which had been installed in the A-4 gun can bay under the cockpit floor, limiting its ammo.

Inverse Amplitude Modulation was used against the SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2B/F) systems.
It radiated into the side-lobes of the radar, while the main-lobe left untouched.
At the Dvina operator screen, this technique resulted a "mustache" shaped target.
The automatic angle tracking would track the side of the "mustache" (where the target shape is widest) instead of the middle of the target causing miss, so the target had to be tracked manually.


Inverse Gain Jamming was used against the AAA SON-4 (Whiff) SON-9 (Fire Can) fire control radar systems.
During target tracking, the pencil beam of the antenna is conically scanned around the tracked target, mechanically. The target tracking system seeks to equalize the received signal strength during the rotation, thus centering the target.
The stronger jammer signal will lure the radar boresight away the target, eventually breaking its angle lock.
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-5 - 02/16/13 11:46 AM

Tiny old black and white image of angle jamming. Awesome! I've been searching for images showing the effect of various jamming techniques. Thanks for posting.

Something I've wondered about though about SAM Simulator. Wouldn't very strong noise jamming cause multiple bands of noise on the radar display, as it receives noise in the side lobes as well as the main lobe?
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-5 - 02/16/13 12:05 PM

Frequency agile radar avoiding swept noise jamming.



And some EW Training software, mainly just a demonstration of the program, but it's kinda interesting anyway Tons of similar videos on the same channel.


Just thought I'd link in case anyone was interested. smile
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-5 - 02/16/13 01:10 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
Something I've wondered about though about SAM Simulator. Wouldn't very strong noise jamming cause multiple bands of noise on the radar display, as it receives noise in the side lobes as well as the main lobe?


We are still in 1965.
Modulated Noise Jamming will come a year later, with a different pod.
biggrin
Posted By: Wolfhound

Re: Electronic Warfare-5 - 02/17/13 03:40 PM

Great posts people very interesting! smile

The following pod is the QRC-160-8, better known as the AN/ALQ-87:

The pod contained pulse modulated and barrage noise jammers that operating in the following frequency bands:

E & F band - 2550Mc to 3650Mc - bandwidth 80 to 275Mc (adjustable)
G & H band - 4910Mc to 5110Mc - bandwidth 25 to 210Mc (adjustable)
*G & H band - 5350Mc to 5550Mc - bandwidth 25 to 210Mc (adjustable) *This is a training band compatible with the Fan Song C radar.
A band (153Mc - 157Mc) noise jammer operates simultaneously with the E & F band or G & H band units whenever a TWS radar signal is identified.

The pod operates in four different modes:

Mode A - 100W pulse noise 25 to 100Mc bandwidth - preset frequency - TWS only
Mode B - 300W pulse noise 25 to 100Mc bandwidth - preset frequency - TWS only
Mode C - 300W pulse noise 80 to 210Mc bandwidth - preset frequency - TWS only
Mode D - 300W pulse noise 80 to 210Mc bandwidth - or barrage noise 80/240Mc bandwidth - automatic - TWS & AA.

So the AN/ALQ-87 could simultaneously perform any two of three functions: denying range and azimuth data to Fire Can; depriving Fan Song of range, altitude and azimuth; and jamming the position beacon (down-link) in the sustainer section of the SA-2 missile. The latter down-link jamming was referred to as 'Special Jamming' and was very effective.
Posted By: Vympel

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/18/13 12:48 PM

Ive done some reading and this is what I found out about noise jamming.

Because noise jamming is range denying, to know how it works we have to know how radars measure range to target. Pulse radars sends energy in small packets many times a second and because of that they get their name. Also there are some terms to simplify things:
PW (Pulse Width - duration of each individual pulse transmitted, measured in microseconds [us]),
PRF (Pulse Repetition Frequency - number of pulses transmitted in a second),
PRI (Pulse Repetition Interval - time from begining of one pulse to the begining of the next one),
Max unambiguous range (Maximum range where a target can be located in a way that reflecting energy from a pulse is received before the next pulse is sent).

Range to target is calculated by measuring the time from transmitting the pulse to receiving reflected energy from the target. After that its easy math to calculate range:

R = (c * t)/2
c - speed of light, t - measured time


Radars maximum unambiguous range is dependent on its PRF, larger PRF results in shorter maximum (unambiguous) range and vice-versa.

Lets suppose we are in command of a pulse radar, we see a target inbound. We are happily transmitting radar energy towards the target on our radars PRF and see him nice and bright on the screen. He then activates his noise jammer. (Lets say his jammer is really simple, transmitting on same frequency as our radar and double our PRF). As our radar transmits a pulse and the pulse reaches the target, targets jammer transmits its own pulse, and just as the reflected+targets pulse reach half way between target and radar target transmits another pulse. So by the time we send the next pulse we have two separate pulses received. Resulting in two targets appearing on the screen. Now target switches its jammer to advanced mode (still simplified) resulting in increasing its PRF many times ourown. This results in our radar registering many targets along the same azimuth and elevation. When the PRF is increased enough to overcome resolution of the radar, all those targets meld into one continuous band of 'targets', making it impossible to track the target in range.

Now I still have a question. I read that radars can simply employ PRF filter thus ignoring most noise jamming. Radar will still process pulses of PRF equal to its own, but that just ads one more target, and if EWR or IADS is present it would practically eliminate the jamming completely. Now, how is it possible to go around that and still noise jam a pulse radar. Is it adding a possibility to change PRF on the fly, and not just set it to a fixed high value? Im sure that could confuse the radar computer.

Also if I got something wrong, please point it out.
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/18/13 01:14 PM

Noise jammers don't transmit pulses, they transmit a continuous signal. There's no pulses you can filter.

A jammer that transmits a pulse based on the radar pulse is a deception jammer. It's used to create a false target. You already know this.

If the jammer emits pulses when the radar pulse hits it, and then slowly introduces a time delay pulse by pulse, it'll look like the target split in two. The real aircraft in front, and the fake jammer target behind.

If the radar uses a fixed PRF, then the jammer will know when the next pulse will arrive before it arrives, and so can transmit a jamming pulse before the radar pulse arrives. This also makes the target seem like it's split in two, but this time the closest target is the fake.

A radar can use jittering, where it varies it's PRF slightly pulse to pulse. This means the jammer will never know exactly when the next radar pulse will arrive, so can only produce fake targets behind the jammer, by starting a timer based on when the pulse arrives.

I think what you mean by PRF filtering, is a radar that uses jittering, and will only see targets which match the transmitted varying PRF.

Noise jamming just transmits a very powerful wall of noise, that covers the reflected signal, so range cannot be determined.

I should probably say I'm not an expert, so don't take what I say as law.
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-6 - 02/18/13 07:35 PM

Still in 1965...

The above mentioned smaller Self Protection Jammers (QRC-160-1, and the AN/ALQ-51) were working on the E band, they were capable of countering the SA-75MK Dvina (SA2A/B/F), and the SON4, SON9 AAA radars.

Stand Off Jamming further complicated the air picture, but it required bigger carrier due to its power and size requirement, that was flying outside of the SAM firing zone.

The ALT-6B used the Spot Noise Jamming technique, in the E band to counter the above mentioned threats.
It had hydraulically tuned magnetron to aim its frequency during flight against a specific SAM site.
This technique allowed narrower bandwidth, and greater jamming range.
Limitations were, that against one Dvina fire control radar, you needed to aim exactly two ALT-6B (epsilon/azimuth), and provided protection only if the attacker plane was between the jammer and the site.

TAC used the EB-66E aircraft that carried 34pcs.
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 02/18/13 07:56 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
Noise jammers don't transmit pulses, they transmit a continuous signal. There's no pulses you can filter.

A jammer that transmits a pulse based on the radar pulse is a deception jammer. It's used to create a false target. You already know this.


That is Range Deception Jamming, or RGPO (Range Gate Pull Off).
To successfully implement it, you will need to wait till the '70s, jammers with more intelligence. (ALQ-126, and the ALQ-131)
This technique needs to predict when the next pulse will arrive, to be able to create false targets before and after the real one.

We will discuss these, when we arrive there...

Originally Posted By: Mdore
If the jammer emits pulses when the radar pulse hits it, and then slowly introduces a time delay pulse by pulse, it'll look like the target split in two. The real aircraft in front, and the fake jammer target behind.


That is the Range Deception Jamming, or RGPO (Range Gate Pull Off).

Originally Posted By: Mdore
If the radar uses a fixed PRF, then the jammer will know when the next pulse will arrive before it arrives, and so can transmit a jamming pulse before the radar pulse arrives. This also makes the target seem like it's split in two, but this time the closest target is the fake.

A radar can use jittering, where it varies it's PRF slightly pulse to pulse. This means the jammer will never know exactly when the next radar pulse will arrive, so can only produce fake targets behind the jammer, by starting a timer based on when the pulse arrives.


Even the Dvina use basic jittering only cheap AAA radars use constant PRF.
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-7 - 02/18/13 08:29 PM

Next year 1966, an improved QRC-160-1 pod was fielded in Vietnam.

The QRC-160-1A (QRC means Quick Reaction Capability) introduced the Modulated Noise Jamming technique against the SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2B/F) fire control radar.

Keeping the QRC-160-1 D/E band 4pcs Voltage Tuned Magnetron's (providing 100W FMCW jamming per magnetron), this pod introduced AM noise on the 6th~8th (96~128Hz) harmonic of the Dvina fire control radar's scanning frequency (16Hz).

At the Dvina scope, this technique resulted 6~8 vertical noise strobe, per plane.
In case of a 4 ship formation, 24~32 vertical noise strobe could completely confuse, or blink the operators...
... causing longer target acquisition, and giving the Weasels more opportunities.



Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 02/20/13 09:34 PM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp
US aviation services (TAC, SAC, NAVY) used different ECM systems, with different methods.

TAC (Tactical Air Command) choice was the QRC-160-1 jamming pod.


Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-8 - 02/23/13 06:57 PM

So far the Electronic Warfare made life more "interesting" for the SAM operators, but with experience and luck, they were still able to achieve...
... but it changed during the next year of the Vietnamese war, 1967.

US EW agencies found out the frequency of the SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2B/F) missile beacon, and it turned out to be in a narrow 20MHz range.
TAC immediately started to send planes with two QRC-160-1/1A pods, where one pod was solely dedicated for the missile beacon noise jamming.
For several months, all missiles were lost right after launch.

A new rule was enforced that before launch, the missile beacon channel should be checked for jamming.
If jamming was present, it was forbidden to launch.



As the situation become critical, Soviet experts were called in to find out and test the solution.
During 1969, Technical Bulletin-1 was released to all Soviet allies using the SA-75MK Dvina system.


It introduced several modifications:

- Adding the H<1 switch by modifying the missile guidance electronic, reducing the minimum effective altitude into 500m.
- Adding the RAB.po.K3 switch, in case of radio proxy fuse jamming. (this was feared by the Soviets, but never happened)
- Adding the PA-00 cabin "doghouse" at the top of the RSNA cabin for visual target tracking, in dense jamming environment.
- Adding the APP-75M instrument, to make launch calculations automatic.
- V-750VK missile FR-I5AK beacon output was increased from 20W into 80W.

After this bulletin was implemented, the beacon jamming become ineffective, and TAC stopped using it.
Quite interesting, that SAC never received hint of this modification, so the B-52 bombers were still trying to jam the missile beacon in 1972, using up valuable jammers for nothing.

Still in the same year (1967), the QRC-160 become official.

QRC-160-1/1A E band Barrage Noise Jamming pod become the AN/ALQ-71, capable of jamming the S-25 Berkut (SA-1), SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2A/B/F), and the SON4, SON9 AAA systems.


QRC-160-2 I band Barrage Noise Jamming pod become the AN/ALQ-72, capable of jamming the S-125 Neva (SA-3) system.
This pod was sent into the Vietnam War, but was never flown operationally proving that the S-125 Neva (SA-3) was never used by the Nort Vietnamese during the war.



QRC-160-8 D..G band Barrage Noise Jamming pod become the AN/ALQ-87, capable of jamming the S-75 Desna (SA-2C), S-75M Volhov (SA-2E) beside the systems already covered by the AN/ALQ-71.


The NAVY also prepared to face new Soviet SAM equipment in Vietnam, by fielding the
AN/ALQ-49 G/H band Angle Deception Jamming System, against the expected S-75 Desna (SA-2C) and the S-75M Volhov (SA-2E) system.
It complemented the already fielded AN/ALQ-51.
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-8 - 03/14/13 09:46 AM

How do you defeat a target that is using modulated noise jamming?
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-8 - 03/14/13 08:35 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
How do you defeat a target that is using modulated noise jamming?


I think it depends of the SAM type... Your questions is too general...
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-8 - 03/16/13 08:01 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
How do you defeat a target that is using modulated noise jamming?


Considering the SA-75M Dvina (SA-2B/F) and the S-75M Volhov (SA-2E), the answer is simple against one plane using Modulated Noise Jamming ...
... you simply need to aim at the middle band.
In case of two or three planes per formation, the picture could be extremely confused, with 2~3x6 vertical bands.
Posted By: farokh

Re: Electronic Warfare-8 - 03/16/13 08:15 PM

guys... please guide me about DM jammer... do u have any picture of it? and someone tell me this pod could be arm on what kind of aircraft?
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-9 - 03/16/13 08:25 PM

In 1970, the AN/ALQ-101 pod was created to counter both the 10cm wave-lenght SA-75M Dvina (SA-2B/F), and the 6cm wave-lenght S-75M Volhov (SA-2E) systems. (one pod against several threats)
The Volhov was expected by the US to pop up in Vietnam. (it never happened)

This pod used TWT (Traveling Wave Tube), capable to cover the 2.6 to 5.2GHz frequency range.



When this system was installed inside of the F-105G Wild Weasel aircraft, it was called the AN/ALQ-105.

During this time, the US NAVY merged the...
- AN/ALQ-49 G/H band (against the S-75M Volhov)
- AN/ALQ-51A D..F band (against the SA-75M Dvina)
... systems into the AN/ALQ-100 angle deception system, available for the (A7A, F4J) planes.


...and the next technological barrier (called RANRAP) was soon to be fallen.

*modified
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-9 - 03/17/13 06:50 AM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp
Originally Posted By: Mdore
How do you defeat a target that is using modulated noise jamming?


Considering the SA-75M Dvina (SA-2B/F) and the S-75M Volhov (SA-2E), the answer is simple against one plane using Modulated Noise Jamming ...
... you simply need to aim at the middle band.


But, unless the modulation of the jamming is exactly synced with the horizontal scanning frequency, the middle band could be slightly to the side of where the actual target is?

Wouldn't that work as crude angle-jamming? Making the missile likely to miss?
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-9 - 03/17/13 07:38 AM

What the manual says (Google translation):

Quote:
Work under the influence of noise on SNR modulated continuous interference, leading away the corners
If the primary and secondary continuous band of noise narrowed or expanded, creating the illusion of displacement director of the angular coordinate, this is evidence of the use of noise-modulated continuous enemy interference.
The procedure for finding the jammer, frequency hopping channels sighting targets and attack targets in this case is the same

as when shooting against continuous unmodulated noise jamming. The main features of combat operation in conditions of the considered noise associated with the choice of method of tracking and techniques to support the direction on the angular coordinates.
Tracking the jammer is only in RS with with system of averaging the target signal off, as modulation noise voltage with a frequency which is a multiple scanning frequency SNR leads to oscillations (lead) energy ¬ cal center interference signal from the angular coordinates ca ¬ simplicity beats, which dramatically increases the error automatically with ¬ spending. Inclusion scheme smoothing (averaging noise) limits the observed signal from the bottom and can not determine the true center of the band noise.
At the beginning of the tracking must support operators to define target motion on the screen at maximum brightness and width * interference, in order to be able to distinguish false - the offset signal interference caused by the asymmetric change the brightness and the bandwidth of the displacement caused by the moving . The operator remembers the position of the middle band interference to its maximum size and brightness in the future continues to monitor the selected point of support.
Especially complex work of operators with a large beat frequency modulation frequency and frequency scanning. In these cases, the screen shows frequent narrowing lanes, creating the illusion of flashing, resulting in a rapid visual attrition and weakening of the operator's attention. These influences can be lowered by reducing the brightness and increased by RRU by changing bandwidth interference. If noise modulated jamming was created by the type of inversion (constant-SVR, th), the support is in the middle of the band, regardless of 1eravnomernoy brightness.
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 09:49 AM

The next breakthrough in the field of Electronic Warfare was the Westinghouse AN/ALQ-131 pod, fielded by the USAF.


This was the first jamming pod, using re-programmable software with digital processor called VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuit) that time, running on 1MHz.
The software of the pod, was able to track and predict the PRF of the threat, a capability was called RANRAP (Random Range Program).
The False Target Jamming technique created 7~8 realistic targets, that had different sizes and some of those were placed closer/further than the jamming plane.



Similar capability was introduced by the NAVY with the Sanders AN/ALQ-126 system built into the F-4, F-14, F-18, A-4, A-6, and A-7 planes.


Posted By: farokh

Re: Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 10:33 AM

guys... pleas e guide me about DM jammer...
do u have any picture of it?
and someone tell me this pod could be arm on what kind of aircraft
? wave
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 10:53 AM

Originally Posted By: farokh
[b]guys... pleas e guide me about DM jammer...
do u have any picture of it?


List of jammers mounted on B-52/EB-66 (during Vietnam war):


Google them and pick-up some pictures...
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 11:03 AM

Originally Posted By: farokh
guys... pleas e guide me about DM jammer...
do u have any picture of it?
and someone tell me this pod could be arm on what kind of aircraft
? wave


DM jammer, what is that?

These techniques are on the table, and we already discussed the red colored ones:

Denial Jamming:
- Barrage Noise Jamming
- Spot Noise Jamming
- Swept Spot Noise Jamming
- Cover Pulse Noise Jamming
- Modulated Noise Jamming

Deceptive Jamming:
- False Target Jamming
- Range Deception Jamming (Range Gate Pull Off)
- Angle Deception Jamming (Inverse Amplitude Modulation, Inverse Gain Jamming, Swept Square Wave)
- Velocity Deception Jamming (Velocity Gate Pull Off, Doppler Noise, Narrow-band Doppler Noise, Doppler False Targets)
- Mono-pulse Deception Jamming (Cross Polarization Jamming, Cross Eye Jamming)
Posted By: farokh

Re: Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 11:42 AM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp
Originally Posted By: farokh
guys... pleas e guide me about DM jammer...
do u have any picture of it?
and someone tell me this pod could be arm on what kind of aircraft
? wave


DM jammer, what is that?

These techniques are on the table, and we already discussed the red colored ones:

Denial Jamming:
- Barrage Noise Jamming
- Spot Noise Jamming
- Swept Spot Noise Jamming
- Cover Pulse Noise Jamming
- Modulated Noise Jamming

Deceptive Jamming:
- False Target Jamming
- Range Deception Jamming (Range Gate Pull Off)
- Angle Deception Jamming (Inverse Amplitude Modulation, Inverse Gain Jamming, Swept Square Wave)
- Velocity Deception Jamming (Velocity Gate Pull Off, Doppler Noise, Narrow-band Doppler Noise, Doppler False Targets)
- Mono-pulse Deception Jamming (Cross Polarization Jamming, Cross Eye Jamming)


i see DM jammer on this page ... ASHULUK ... !



also i see this type of jammer in allied forces and vietnam also libya ... what plane can use it ?
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-10 - 03/17/13 12:26 PM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp

DM jammer, what is that?


Decimeter/Meter wave jammers...
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-11 - 03/20/13 06:05 PM

On the 6th of October, 1973 the Yom Kippur War was started.
First time in History, a Continuous Wave illuminated, Semi Active guided Surface to Air Missile system was deployed.



This system use the SURN (Straight Flush*) radar to illuminate the target with a CW signal, while the missile would track the received echo from the target...
... most of the jamming techniques available at that time, would simply highlight the jamming target for the missile SARH head, making the actual guidance more precise.

Israel started the war with AN/ALQ-101 pods, and received further 40pcs of AN/ALQ-119 as an US aid.

The AN/ALQ-119 had the extended capability of jamming the Neva (SA-3) complexes, beside the Dvina (SA-2B/F) and the Volhov (SA-2E) systems that was already covered by the AN/ALQ-101.



During the war, these systems were solely used to jam the Dvina/Volhov/Neva (SA-2B/C/E/F, SA-3B) systems.
The jamming of the KUB (SA-6) was not attempted, in a fear of attracting the SA-6 missiles.

* Straight Flush means 5 cards in poker, relating to the 5 frequency, the SURN uses during engagement
Posted By: farokh

Re: Electronic Warfare-11 - 04/02/13 09:40 PM

what the RGPO ? this one use by EA system... i dont know this one can make what problem for sam operators ... confused
Posted By: Hpasp

Electronic Warfare-12 - 04/05/13 12:12 PM

During 1976, the F-15 Eagle was fielded.
This was the first USAF aircraft, having Electronic Warfare equipment inbuilt.



The AN/ALQ-135 system had E/I band coverage, effectively jamming the SA-1/2/3/4/Whiff/Fire Can systems.
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 04/24/13 04:52 PM

WTF is this?

Unknown jammer...

Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/26/13 07:16 PM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp


The AN/ALQ-135 system had E/I band coverage, effectively jamming the SA-1/2/3/4/Whiff/Fire Can systems.


Strange....
1. How do they know SA-1 capabilities as it was stationed around Moscow only?
2. Why they still want to jam it, as it is highly unlikely that a single F-15 could reach Moscow?...
Posted By: Lieste

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/26/13 08:30 PM

But somehow a single C-172 managed just that... from Finland, in 1987 - landing right in the middle of the city right outside the Kremlin. Afterwards Red Square was occasionally referred to as Sheremetyevo-3
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/27/13 08:59 AM

Originally Posted By: piston79

1. How do they know SA-1 capabilities as it was stationed around Moscow only?
2. Why they still want to jam it, as it is highly unlikely that a single F-15 could reach Moscow?...


Only educated guesses. But the SA-1 was developed with the assistance of German scientists. When Stalin died, the scientists were allowed to return home, and were very thoroughly interviewed by the US. They may have got enough information that way.

Or ELINT aircraft may have helped. Or old fashioned spies. The SA-1 entered service 30 years before the F-15, that's three decades for spies to get their hands on technical documents.

As to why? Maybe it was easy, so why not? In the event of WW3, I think the idea was the Russians would reach Paris, or NATO would reach Moscow. So it wasn't completely impossible they'd meet.

And according to wikipedia ( though most other sources disagree ), the SA-1 was exported to North Korea in 1962. So the F-15 might have faced them there.
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/29/13 06:18 PM

Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 09/16/13 08:27 PM

Originally Posted By: Lieste
But somehow a single C-172 managed just that... from Finland, in 1987 - landing right in the middle of the city right outside the Kremlin. Afterwards Red Square was occasionally referred to as Sheremetyevo-3


You do not believe it was not seen at all, aren't you?
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 10/10/13 07:37 PM

Originally Posted By: piston79

On the second one - not sure but "Wobble" must reveal the false target (when jamming generates a lot false target in the boresight... don't know the english word for this jamming)..


"Wobble" is a random change in frequency (not just 2 frequencies we have in basic "Goa").....
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 10/11/13 11:23 AM

Nice video, enemy radars are played by the Nike Hercules...
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 10/11/13 11:30 AM

Originally Posted By: Mdore

And according to wikipedia ( though most other sources disagree ), the SA-1 was exported to North Korea in 1962. So the F-15 might have faced them there.


Never seen SA-1 in N.Korea (easy to identify) on Google Earth, and also it is highly unlikely that it was ever exported outside of SU.
(the export version was the SA-2)
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 11/26/13 11:20 AM




AN/ALE-50 I presume...
Posted By: Alien_MasterMynd

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 11/26/13 12:44 PM

See here

They write it has a fiber optic link, but it applies to AN/ALE-55, but it has a different shape.
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/09/13 06:41 PM

Jamming effects on P-18 radar:


















Source:

http://rtv-pvo-gsvg.narod.ru/doc/605344_27AFB_dedyaev_v_n_specialnaya_podgotovka.pdf
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/10/13 06:30 AM

Very nice find!

#4 seems odd to me.

Google translate says: "PPI screen when exposed to continuous noise interference (on screen
wound observed darkened sector due to overload receiver tract)"

I wish I spoke Russian
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/10/13 05:47 PM

Originally Posted By: Mdore
Very nice find!

#4 seems odd to me.

Google translate says: "PPI screen when exposed to continuous noise interference (on screen
wound observed darkened sector due to overload receiver tract)"


Yes, that's true.... The jamming is so heavy, that it overloaded the receiver... So, the jammer should be somewhere in the dark... wink
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/11/14 06:25 PM

Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/21/14 05:40 PM

Originally Posted By: piston79
Jamming effects on P-18 radar:

Click to reveal..

















Source:

http://rtv-pvo-gsvg.narod.ru/doc/605344_27AFB_dedyaev_v_n_specialnaya_podgotovka.pdf


Great collection, probably each would deserve a separate discussion, but now I want to highlight the Spirals...





This is usually caused by a similar equipment at the firing range on a closeby location.
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/21/14 06:06 PM

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-t...i2a03p_0001.htm

PROXY FUSE ELINT...
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 05/21/14 07:25 PM

Just to warn, I'm planning a series of the Easter side EW - EA equipments...
... it might be a good prelude for the future.





Posted By: ePap

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/21/14 07:55 PM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp
Originally Posted By: piston79
Jamming effects on P-18 radar:

Click to reveal..

















Source:

http://rtv-pvo-gsvg.narod.ru/doc/605344_27AFB_dedyaev_v_n_specialnaya_podgotovka.pdf


Great collection, probably each would deserve a separate discussion, but now I want to highlight the Spirals...





This is usually caused by a similar equipment at the firing range on a closeby location.


I can confirm that for OSA AK(M) !
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 05/22/14 04:50 AM

Originally Posted By: Hpasp

This is usually caused by a similar equipment at the firing range on a closeby location.


Yes, this is confirmed in a source book of those pictures. I have seen such on P-18 screen but didn't knew what it was 'till now! (I thought it was from USAF/USN jammers)
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/15/14 02:58 PM

This must be the digital version of AN/ALR-20 is an airborne tuned Radio Frequency (RF) receiver countermeasures receiving set, which was used from B-52's EWO-s:

Posted By: PN79

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 01/20/15 08:23 PM

I am not sure if this was already posted here or not but it should not be missed:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyFqaaqqph0

- US 1962 instructional video about ECM equipment
Posted By: Jonas85

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 02/17/15 11:15 AM

Hi all,

this is my first post in this forum. I've found the SAMSIM a couple years ago and I was really fascinated with this simulator (many thanks to HPASP for creating and polishing this thing!)

Here is a very interesting doc that I googled here from the 55th Wing website

I copied in the interesting part below. I have a question: why achieving the tracking error of 200 ft (or even 500ft) was considered 'good enough' for the jamming B-52, if this still puts B-52 well within the blast radius of SA-2 DVINA missile (which is is like 300m=984 ft). Does not this leave the bomber well inside the kill sphere?

The SCR 584 was used on the Eglin AFB bomb test range to perform radar bomb scoring. (The test range became the ECM test range in the early 60’s). The range consisted of six sites that are spaced a mile apart on Santa Rosa Island. The six sites transferred jamming data to a large computer complex on Eglin AFB that would follow the ECM test aircraft using the SADS 1 radar. The SADS 1 (a M 33 radar) could track the ECM aircraft very accurately. Initially dry data (no ECM radiation) was collected on the SADS 1 and SADS 2 (a simulated SA 2 system.) The miss distance between the SADS 1 and the SADS 2 had to be 50 feet or less in over 80% of the simulated missile tracks for the system errors to be eliminated. Then the jammer was turned on and the miss distance of the plane’s position as measured by SADS 1 and SADS 2 was compared. An ECM technique was considered good if 80% of the test’s simulated missiles missed the ECM test target by over 200 feet...

... Three years later, in the fall of 1972, I joined Major Billy Nix at SAC Headquarters. Major Nix needed an ECM engineer to calculate the attrition rate of the B-52 should we bomb NVN in an attempt to end the war.

First, my team examined the ECM test data that SAC had recently collected at Eglin AFB ECM test range. The optimum technique showed that 80% of the simulated missiles passed more than 200 feet from the test B-52. They had also developed a new flight formation tactic of three-plane “cells”, spaced 500 feet apart in Azimuth, Elevation and Range with the location known only to each cell leader. This produced multiple jamming strobes on the SA 2 scopes. If all three operators were not tracking the same B-52 an additional 500 feet of missile error was created. If this situation sounds confusing, imagine the problems the three NVN SA 2 operators had in assuring that each was tracking the same B-52. SAC 3 analysis of the three-plane “cell” formation testing at Eglin ECM test range showed a 10% increase over a single plane target in the number of simulated missiles passing more than 200 feet from the test B-52.

Finally, Soviet SA 2 missile engineers designed a fragmentation pattern of four ounce frags to maximize the probability of kill (PK) of the 400 pound warhead after the proximity fuse was turned on. The warhead produced a pattern of one frag per square foot at 50 feet. Note: A pilot in the cockpit is approximately two cubic feet in volume. Thus if the missile and the B-52 are flying head-on the frag pattern, shaped like an expanding dog collar perpendicular to the X axis of the missile, will kill the pilot as well as bring down the B-52. However, if the B-52
ECM caused the missile to fly an erratic pattern, the PK of the missile would be much lower. I came up with an attrition rate of 3% which was a combination of the three-plane cell formation, the optimum noise modulation ECM technique and the fragmentation pattern of the SA 2. Now the plan was made. The 3% attrition rate was considered acceptable.

We thought a three day campaign would break the back of NVN. We limited the bombing fleet to nine three-plane cells spaced four hours apart. This minimized the probability of a mid-air collision. The campaign was launched on December 18, 1972. On the first day, three aircraft were lost at ranges of ten, twenty and thirty miles from the SA 2 sites. NVN changed their strategy on day two by concentrating their missile intercepts at the thirty mile range. Only one airplane was lost because at that distance the frag pattern was less than one frag/100 feet. On day three, NVN realized that if they delayed the attacks until the aircraft were ten to twelve miles away, just after the B-52 released its bombs. It was better for the SA 2 as the bomb bay doors were still open, increasing the radar cross section of the B-52. This ensured greater missile success for NVN and they brought down seven aircraft.

On the morning of the fourth day Major Billy Nix asked me to go to the Eglin test site to observe the SADS 2 testing and try to determine why we lost seven aircraft the prior day. I observed weak jamming at the radar scopes. The next day at SAC Headquarters I reported the weak jamming and asked if the jamming patterns had been optimized for the low altitude of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and not for the high altitude mission that the B-52s were flying in NVN. After talking with Northrop DSD it was determined that the antennas had not been optimized for high altitude. They could be optimized for high altitude by changing the “pancake” shaped pattern to a “donut” shaped pattern below the airplane. This would create a 6 dB improvement at -45o but it would take six days for the first antenna to be delivered. Because the loss rate was as indicated in our analysis, we continued the campaign.

Contributing to the seven aircraft loss on day three was the effort to bomb one of the SA 2 sites that had shot down four of the B-52s. I advised against this decision because it would require flying a radial heading directly over the site. Also the site location was not accurately known as GPS did not exist at this time. My experience at Eglin in the early 50’s indicated that the 500 pound bombs we were using could not destroy the site except with a direct hit and we would probably lose several aircraft. My prediction proved to be correct as we lost two of the nine aircraft in bombing this site and the site was back on the air the next day. On the fifth through the eleventh day we lost less than one aircraft per day for a total of fifteen aircraft. On December 29, 1972 NVN agreed to sign a truce ending the conflict.

Lessons Learned

Part of the last eighteen months of my Air Force career was spent determining the lessons learned from the Linebacker 11 campaign. The first of three lessons learned was the importance of destroying the EW/GCI radar that
provided data to the SA 2 sites before commencing the attack. This EW/GCI site also controlled the enemy fighter aircraft. The second lesson was the importance of destroying the runways in the initial days of the attack, eliminating the ability of the fighters to land in the dark after a mission. The third lesson was to avoid flying directly over a SAM site. The AF applied these lessons during Desert Storm to great effect. The loss rate was fractions of 1% and I think no F-15s or B-52s were lost to SAMS...
Posted By: Mdore

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 02/17/15 02:14 PM

The kill sphere is 65m not 300m. 300m is the maximum range you can expect to still score some hits.

Reading what you posted, it seems jamming created at least 200ft of miss distance, possibly more, with an extra 500ft on top of that making a minimum of 700ft if the jamming caused the elevation, azimuth or range office to track different targets.

Forcing the sam to fly an erratic path might possible impact the range of the missile too. But that's more of a guess.
Posted By: GrayGhost

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 02/23/15 05:25 PM

ECM may also cause detonation timing issues, which combined with the miss distance result in a complete miss.
Posted By: scrim

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 02/23/15 05:58 PM

Yup. I don't know about all the different things EW does, but with noise jamming at least you need to have the SA-2 arm itself after 11 seconds of flight as in SAM sim. Having it armed so early means it will detonate the moment the proximity fuze reacts to something, e.g. chaff if I've understood it all correctly.
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 03/27/15 05:58 PM

Good manual on EW

http://falcon.blu3wolf.com/Docs/Electronic-Warfare-Fundamentals.pdf
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/17/15 09:38 PM

Nice one

http://www.raytheon.com/news/rtnwcm/groups/public/documents/content/ew-quick-guide-pdf.pdf
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 12/19/15 05:28 PM

another nice one...

http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawcwd/ewssa/downloads/NAWCWD%20TP%208347.pdf
Posted By: KJakker

Re: Electronic Warfare-12 - 01/03/16 04:02 PM

Hpasp, do you have any plans to update the Electronic Warfare component of Sam Simulator to include more advanced EW techniques than just metric and centimeter wavelength noise jamming?
Posted By: pamak

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/09/16 11:21 AM

hello everybody,

I am a new member from Greece. I found this site because I was looking for information about the radiation pattern of jammers. I found this interesting picture regarding the QRC-160 but I cannot read Russian. Can anybody translate the text in the photo?

Thank you
Posted By: Jonas85

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/09/16 02:26 PM

Well, this picture is fairly simple.

It shows the jamming effects of the QRC-160 protection jammer on the basic version of SA-2 system (Dvina) with no ECCM capabilities at various ranges (>=60-12km, <=12 km head-on and passing by, >=12 km receding target).

QRC-160 jammer emits most of its energy at the angle of 15 degrees (depicted is a jammer antenna main lobe of estimated width 12 +- 6 degrees). In order to achieve the greatest jamming effect, the aircraft pilot must keep the jammer pointed at the SA-2 radar.

QRC-160 jams in range: instead of a target blip, you see a vertical "bar" of noise - operator does not know the range, but he can determine angles (azimuth and elevation) by centering on the bar. Usually, a single jammer aircraft is not well protected (SA-2 can shoot in TT mode when no range info is available).

To achieve the necessary level of protection, 4 jammer equipped aircraft fly so called "pod formation": flying close enough together makes the separate bars of noise merge together in to one large bar and be indistinguishable. Adding a vertical spacing between aircrafts also confounds azimuth and angle operators (they are no longer sure they are tracking the same target).

In the rightmost picture, you see the jamming effect when it is the most strongest - every single target is hidden in the thick middle "bar" of noise (the target blip is only shown only for reference, real operator does not see it). Hence the angle information is denied.

The thinner noise bars to the left and to the right of the center is the jamming entering the antenna through the sidelobes. In the middle picture you see what happens when the aircraft closes to 12 km and the SA-2 radar leaves the jammer antenna mainlobe - operators can see the target clearly and they can shoot. However, this opportunity is very brief, as the aircraft will quickly escape inside the min-range of the engagement zone (engement zone charted on the right). Also, it is difficult to acquire and lock a target that passes by with a high radial velocity - you can actually try it on SAMSIM and see how it works).

The left most picture shows the same effect created by the receding jamming aircraft formation after it passed the SA-2 (probably, after completing a successful bombing run on the ground target). The targets again are completely obscured by a thick bar of noise, no shooting possible.
Posted By: pamak

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/09/16 04:34 PM

Thank you for your effort. I understood your post for the most part. Based on what you said, I have three questions which fortunately require brief answers

1. What is the language of the text in the picture?

2. In the upper left picture there is something that reads like " 0.6 P" followed by a five letter word (in Cyrillic characters) and in the the upper right picture there
is something that reads like "0.4 P" followed by the same five letter word. Do you have any idea regarding the
meaning of this text?

3 Finally, you mentioned the "TT mode". Can you tell me the meaning (words) of this acronym?


Thank you and I appreciate the time you take to answer my questions
Posted By: Jonas85

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/09/16 05:23 PM

1. It is all in Russian. More precisely, it is a scan from the book "Combat employment of the anti-air missile forces (based on Vietnam war experiences)", p.193.,

2. 0.4P and 0.6P refer to the jamming power levels generated by jammer's forward and backward directional antennas (the book claims that the backward jamming was stronger to better protect receding aircraft). "Izluchenie" means "Radiation" in Russian (refers to the the radio signal power).

3. "TT" mode is the abbreviation from Russian "Trech-tochka" ("A three-point guidance method"). Please take a look at HPASP's excellent SAMSIM manual for SA-2 for the description.
Posted By: pamak

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/09/16 06:04 PM

Thank you again:

I will consult the manual for the TT method.

I wish there was an English translation of the book you mentioned [ Combat employment of the anti-air missile forces (based on Vietnam war experiences)]. The link does not work because it seems you copied it from your computer, but in any case since I do not speak Russian, I cannot read the book even if I have it in front of me. Still, I really liked the image posted in this forum.
Posted By: Jonas85

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 03/10/16 10:48 AM

I attempted to fix the link. In any case, it should be available on the http://historykpvo.narod2.ru/ website. There are tons of documents, books and photos about soviet SAMs (all in Russian, of course).
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 09/15/16 07:26 PM







EF-111A ALQ-99 transmitter installation (above, below). These images show a typical mix of transmitter modules, with unique steerable antenna installations for four different bands. The emitter boresight depression angle is a compromise intended to accommodate both standoff and escort jamming. The aircraft, 66-0041 of the 429th ECS at Cannon AFB, NM, was photographed at Malmstrom AFB, Montana (© 2012, Phil Peterson).
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 10/14/16 03:04 PM

DECM

Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 11/11/16 09:03 AM

Posted By: Jonas85

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 11/11/16 11:49 AM

Can't wait to put my hands on it! cheers

Hpasp, what kind of deception jamming will be implemented (false targets, RPGO, AM-modulated angle jamming, side-lobe jamming)?
Will GShV/GShN be enabled as means of ECCM for the player?

Do you also plan to do chaff modeling at some point for SAMSIM?
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare-4 - 11/11/16 12:03 PM

As of today, I started programming RPGO.
Posted By: Hpasp

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 03/02/17 06:07 PM

Nice...
... 1B52H Electronic Warfare Officer's Manual
http://www.avialogs.com/index.php/a...onic-warfare-officer-s-manual-b-52h.html
thumbsup
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 03/24/17 01:04 PM

,

Attached picture 9a456-alq-1842bew2bpod.jpg
Posted By: piston79

Re: Electronic Warfare (EW), including Electronic Attack (EA) & Electronic Protection (EP) - 05/18/17 07:28 AM

Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft ...ign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107 th Congress February 9, 2001
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