Re: S-75M3 Volhov (SA-2E Guideline)

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October 27, 1962 S- 75 shot down a U- 2 over Cuba


In 1962, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis 27 October was recorded eight violations of Cuban airspace by American planes . Division Major IM Gerchenova missile launch S- 75 "Desna" knocked down at an altitude of 21,000 m spy plane U.S. Air Force U- 2 . Head developer of the complex - KB- 1 (now of " GSKB " Almaz-Antey ").




More about the event from the archives of "Vestnik PVO " :
A KENNEDY suspects KHRUSHCHOV ...
Who ordered to shoot down U.S. spy plane over Cuba ?

Major USAF Rudolph Anderson , raising the morning of October 27 , 1962 in high-altitude air reconnaissance " Lockheed " U- 2 , did not know that it was his last flight , in fact - this is the last day of his life . At 8:00 local time, he crossed the border of the Cuban Air Force , and after 1 hour and 20 minutes body manned aircraft shook them a heavy blow . Anderson is the second blow did not feel ... Falling , U- 2 fell to pieces .

Dozens of versions over the past 38 years, expressed about the drama . The most common - spy plane shot down by Cuban anti-aircraft gunners . President John F. Kennedy was convinced that the plane shot down on the orders of Nikita Khrushchev . But this is not true .

International assistance

In June 1961, Moscow agreed to provide military assistance to the government of Fidel Castro , the goal - to prevent the U.S. invasion of Cuba . General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR developed an operation for the transfer of military units and medium-range missiles R-12 and R-14 on the revolutionary island. Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba was appointed Gen. Issa Pliev . Among other things, went and 6 anti-aircraft missile and artillery regiments , summarized in two divisions .

Americans could not know that the Soviet antiaircraft calculations arrived on the island . Their planes invaded Cuban airspace , sometimes they reached SAM positions that are " silent ."

However, by October 25-26, setting difficult.

Of cryptogram from Havana to Moscow : "Since October 23 , more frequent incursions of American planes in Cuban airspace and flights over the island at various altitudes , including at altitudes of 150-200 meters. Only for 26 October were more than eleven such flights .

Cuban friends think inevitably invasion and bombing of military targets . 26.H.62 Resident of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR . "

American pilots requested their command posts on the start bombing plaintext . Then Fidel Castro ordered his armed forces to shoot down without warning all enemy warplanes appearing over Cuba . Notify the General Pliev was raised . Late in the evening of 26 October, he made ​​a decision in the case of strikes by U.S. aircraft on Soviet troops to use all available means of defense and sent a coded telegram to the Minister of Defense Marshal Rodion Malinovsky . In Moscow, the decision adopted .

October 27, 1962

Morning ... for antiaircraft missile battalion , commanded by Major Ivan Gerchenov ( they carried on combat duty in the town of Banes , 180 km from the higher command post ) , began with the strongest tropical downpour . Here it is appropriate to refer to the story of Nicholas Antonets participant in the events ( in October 1962 captain, chief of staff of anti-aircraft missile division ) : "Yesterday we received a secret coded telegram : be ready for combat operations , expected American invasion . We were allowed to be aired include station . Everyone felt that the war is possible . at ten o'clock in the area under the radar troops we have evidence that the American Guantanamo in our direction moving U.S. aircraft - goal number 33. Immediately station found him . at signal " - another's " response not followed. Height - 22 kilometers ...

In the cockpit - complete silence , frozen in anticipation with me battalion commander Ivan Gerchenov commander Vasily Gorchakov radio batteries , guidance officer Alexander Ryapenko operators . Goal taken by hand, then on the automatic tracking , here it is - in the area of ​​start-up. The silence was interrupted by the voice of Major Gerchenova : " What do we do ? Shoot ? " Looked at me. I kept in touch with KP part , so immediately asked when will be the team to destruction. Then repeated the request . I said, " Wait , the team is about to go ." And then : " Destroy target number 33 , three, turn." This means - three rockets should go one by one in six seconds . We have turned out differently.

Ryapenko reported: "First , start" . Startovapa first rocket . Have a seizure . Again silence , you can hear a panting operators. Her voice broke the officer's guidance : "The goal - a meeting ." And the purpose of flying. And then suddenly remembered Gerchenov instead of three missiles we let one . It turned out, they began to shoot single . Addicted duel. Launched the second missile . On the radar screen is seen as two points closer together - and the purpose of the rocket . Here they are merged into one , and a new report Ryapenko , this time joyous " Second - undermining , target is destroyed , bearing 322 , range 12 kilometers." Analysis showed that the plane was shot down a missile in the first 9:00 of 20 minutes, but was still gliding flight . From the second U- 2 rocket fell apart into small pieces.

In place of the crash has left our political officer Major Grechanik . Impact area is patrolled by the Cuban military. The front part of the U-2 with the pilot fell near Banes , and the tail - the coast , in the Gulf. Grechanik at his request, handed a piece of the fuselage with the room, and he is now stored in the part .

After a day or two heard : there telegram defense minister supposedly plane shot down prematurely, but to us it does not affect . The decision was made not to destroy us. "

So who makes the decisions?

It seems a rhetorical question. In the army, all painted, including this. All true. But the fact of the matter is that in the case of the destruction of the U-2 over Cuba , apparently , got the problem .

Some participants in the events of the Cuban believe that the decision taken by the CP Group's troops in Havana - namely, the deputy commander of the air defense Lieutenant General Stepan Grechko . The latter contend that Grechko faltered , and the goal is ordered to destroy the commander of the 27th Air Defense Division Colonel Georgy Voronkov . In the arsenal of evidence on both sides - the memory , and it is known to happen , and sums , especially after a few decades.

According to a former deputy commander in Cuba for military training Leonid Garbuz , now Major General Retired , events unfolded so .

When he arrived in the morning on October 27 KP Groups troops fighting crew work led Stepan Grechko, radio center was leading a reconnaissance plane . Grechko GARBUZ reported that on several occasions called Pliev , but he does not answer. At this time, a duty officer reported on changing the course objectives in the north- west. Grechko picked up again , but there was no reply . U- 2 could open fully missile defense grouping and grouping and leave, but Grechko not dare to give an order without a commander . According Garbuz , Pliev established strict order in the management of defense . He forbade the field to open fire on their own and said that decision will be made by himself. Pliev at this time was likely to Fidel Castro. After another query operations duty gearbox division , Grechko prone to being to destroy the target. He asked the opinion of the first deputy commander Lieutenant General Paul Dankevich , Chief of Staff of Military Force Lieutenant-General Pavel Akindinova and Maj. Gen. Garbuz . All of them were in favor of destroying targets , and Grechko ordered . But is it ?

Order Colonel Voronkov

Checkpoint 27th Air Defense Division , which was located on the outskirts of the city of Camaguey , which is 600 km from Havana , cut a crew headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Management - a duty officer Major General Nikolai Serova .

According to him , and they also presented a rather convincing , events unfolded as follows .

"I made ​​atonement for combat duty at 9 am on October 26 - wrote me Serova . - Duty carried in radio silence . Evening on the phone with me contacted the division commander Colonel Georgy Voronkov . He gave me the following: " Got encryption - tomorrow at dawn war . Bring the division in combat readiness , but secretly . " After a few minutes officers directions reported on their readiness for combat , were all included air defenses, the CP arrived Colonel Voronkov officers full combat crew .

In readiness for combat duty we spent the night of 26 to 27 October . Dawn , but it was quiet , the radar aerial targets were not observed. But nerves are all on edge, fatigue impacted sleepless night . At eight o'clock came even encryption . We were instructed to go on duty abbreviated calculations and open fire only when you explicitly enemy attack . Therefore, the division commander, with staff officers went for breakfast and stay at the headquarters , which was located in the city. Again, we did not sleep all night . KP on my shift Acronym calculation and responsible staff of the division of Colonel Ivan Aleshin (Head radar troops divisions).

At nine o'clock in the morning on October 27 tablet planshetisty general air situation began to render high-altitude target, which moved over Cuban territory towards Havana - Santiago de Cuba . The flight route and altitude ( 20 km ) leads to the conclusion that it is the U.S. spy plane U- 2 , and that he photographed our military formations . Commanders of air defense missile regiments became strongly request from me, the decision to open fire , proving that this is a clear attack . Others believed that a scout with impunity intelligence can not produce our products - after his position collapses crushing bomb . Let me remind you , by the time we were all set to repel an attack , " not cool down " yet . Reported by telephone to the CP Group's troops in Havana General Grechko that commanders insist on destroying reconnaissance aircraft . This is where it all started.

For more than 30 minutes were interminable " debates " between MP antiaircraft missile troops , our MP and General Grechko : open fire or not, clear the attack or not, what the consequences for our troops can then be etc. General Grechko advised to take the time to wait , he says, " did not get through to the commander ."

A U- 2 is already close to the southeastern tip of the island , the city of Santiago de Cuba, where there was a regiment commanded by Colonel Rzhevskij . I asked Colonel Aleshin him to report on the phone setting the division commander , but he answered you appropriately . I dialed landline and reported to headquarters : " Over Cuba spy plane U-2 photographs battle formations of our troops. Commanders of insisting on opening fire on it , find it obvious attack. Checkpoint Groups troops no solution, more than 40 minutes did not get through to the commander . " After a short pause , apparently weighing the "pros " and "cons " , Colonel Georgy Voronkov ordered to destroy spy plane , and added that immediately goes to KP.

Decision commander of the 27th Air Defense Division I immediately handed over to the officers directions antiaircraft missile parts and reported this to the CP Group General Grechko troops , but he said nothing. Colonel Korolev officers hurried to the cabin areas for personal involvement in the leadership of the destruction of the enemy aircraft . Lockheed U- 2 in the meantime , flying over Cuba , more than 600 km, retired towards the sea, and our means of finding his lost . What to do? I give the command in the shelves: " Be prepared to open fire on the U- 2 in the case of re-entry ." After a few minutes , U-2 found again . My assumptions come true - scout returned for re- photographing our positions . At 9 hours and 20 minutes Division Major Gerchenova goal destroyed near the town of Banes . I reported this to the CP Group of Forces General Grechko , but again he told me nothing .

Soon arrived at the KP Colonel Voronkov and took control calculation in their hands. After 30-40 minutes of silence with the CP Group's troops began to request , specify : who shot down, where the plane fell , and so on. "

And now back to Havana. Army General Pliev took the report on destruction reconnaissance aircraft safely . He only gave the order to expedite data collection and prepare coded telegram to the Minister of Defence. On the basis of its Malinowski

October 28 at 10.45 Khrushchev sent an official report .

October 28th Chief of Staff of Military Force Lt. Gen. Paul Akindinov briefed all those involved in the destruction of U- 2 encryption of received from the Minister of Defense. It consisted of two sentences : " You hurry. Outline ways of settlement."

The headquarters were expecting a more stringent telegrams , but they were not followed. Cuban leadership is perceived fact preventing the flight of delight - the first time the Americans were punished for rule of the demand in the sky without Cuba.

source of information

Anatoly Dokuchaev, Independent Military Review, number 30 , 18.08.2000