I was wondering if anyone could give me some tips on controlling an air to air fight (flight-sim or otherwise) from the perspective of a flight leader? Thanks to Andy's most excellent articles, I think I have a pretty good grasp of what to do with my own ship in a furball, and I have a basic understanding of how to position my flight going into a fight, but once I hit the merge, everything becomes a free for all. More often than not, I end up losing track of my wingman, playing a lot of lone ranger, and then trying to figure out what happened *after* the fight.

Games like Janes F-15 put you in command of groups of up to 8 aircraft. How the heck do you leverage those guys going into a large scale aerial fight? How do you (or do you) maintain any kind of control once you hit the merge, and how do you maintain group coherency across multiple engagements within a short time period?






[This message has been edited by Spiff (edited October 18, 1999).]

Spiff

Excellent question. Before we talk about how things are done today, let's take a quick look at past times and the factors that entered into the picture then.

In WW1, aircraft radios had not yet been invented, so basic hand signals were used...something along the line of 'Go that way' or 'Follow me'!! Once engaged, most flights quickly broke up into a big furball. One reason for this was the very small turning radius of WW1 fighters. The relatively small size of the fight airspace tended to break up the formations into many 1v1s.

In WW2, the evolution of flight control began in 1939 with something not much more sophisticated than what was used in WW1, and ended six years later with a fairly technically advanced system that used both reliable radios as well as the beginnings of radar control.

Depending on the nationality involved, the method of flight control in WW2 varied somewhat widely. The main factors in this were the following: (1) the mission of the fighter force - offensive or defensive, (2) the state of the art of their radio technology, and (3) the type of formations used.

(1) Mission - Various air forces controlled their flights depending on the mission. The best example of this is the comparison of the RAF to the Luftwaffe. The RAF spent the years from 1918 to 1939 preparing to defend England against a German bomber attack. The belief was that the German bombers would attack unescorted because the range of fighters in those days precluded German fighters from flying to England from German bases. (The Brits failed to consider that the Luftwaffe may have the advantage of using French, Dutch, or Belgain bases.) Because of this, the RAF developed a system designed to shoot down non-maneuvering bomber streams. Another important factor was in this picture. The primary armament of RAF fighters was the .303 machine gun. Because of its small caliber, the RAF thought that a number of guns would be needed to shoot down a modern bomber. That's why the Spitfire and Hurricane had so many guns. But the Brits didn't stop there. They then decided that more than one fighter would be needed so a formation system was designed that would allow the leader to take his flight of aircraft and reach a firing position from which all aircraft would fire at once. That is why the three ship 'vic' of RAF fighters looks the way it does in pictures from those times. The wingmen would fly in very close formation, looking only at the leader. The leader aimed not only himself but also everyone else. When he said 'fire', everyone shot...but the wingmen did not individually aim...they just flew formation. The idea was that the weight of fire coming from all three aircraft would be enough to knock down a bomber or two. Lastly, the RAF leader had to memorize a number of scripted flight profiles that were designed to handle any approach to a bomber formation. He would pick the appropriate formation, radio it to the other flight members, and then he would issue the directive calls to assemble and maneuver the formation as a single entity.

If this sounds bizarre and unwieldy, it was. But it was not until well past the Battle of Britain time frame that combat losses finally forced the RAF to adopt more flexible concepts.

And whose did they adopt? Why, the Luftwaffe's of course...as had most air forces by that time, including much of the US forces.

The Luftwaffe was designed to be an extension of the German Army. It was a highly maneuverable and offensive fighting force. To gain the flexibility needed, the Luftwaffe basic fighting element was a two ship with the wingman supporting the leader. The wingman flew line abreast whenever possible and was not rigidly controlled by the leader...it was more of a 'fighting pair' than a 'fighting leader supported by a trailing wingman'.

By the end of WW2, most air forces had instituted some version of the German system. Radios were now the norm and formation maneuvering was done with radio commands. Radar had evolved to the point that formations could be reliably vectored into the fight.

This sysyem lasted until the Vietnam war era. At that point, something new came along to change the equation...and that something was the air to air missile. The USAF went into the Vietnam war flying the same kind of formations used in the Korean War. These were adequate formations as long as the threat was guns only. Because of the relatively short range of guns, the USAF formations were designed to with offensive and defensive gun capabilities in mind. USAF formations were based upon a pair of fighters (or groups of pairs) flying what was known as 'Fighting Wing'. In fighting wing, the wingman flew back on an angle of about 30-60 degrees and at a distance of about 500-1500 feet. This allowed the wingman to cover the lead's six from a gun attack. The leader was the primary shooter and would only relinquish this role if the situation resulted in the wingman having a clear shot. The radio was the primary communication tool...by this time a vocabulary had been developed to allow the pilots to communicate using short sentences or single code words.

The problem was that fighting wing formation spacing and shape was incapable of detecting a missile launch until it was too late. In order to see a missile threat, the wingman had to be put line abreast (side by side) with the leader and the spacing had to be extended to up to a mile (6000'). Now, radio calls became all important...visual hand signals were clearly a thing of the past in combat.

Ever since Vietnam, modern air combat has used some variation of the two ship line abreast formation for air to air combat.

Whew...I guess I can answer your question now!! But you needed this background to understand what we do today.

The basic rules of air combat formation control are set down in what is known as the 'Engaged Fighter/Supporting Fighter Contract' (EF/SF).

The EF/SF sets down in writing which flight member (leader or wingman) is responsible for what and when. Here is the guts of the EF/SF.

1. The leader is always ultimately in control no matter what.

2. But...because of the very high speeds and deadly, long range weapons in use...the wingman is now given a large say in how things are done.

3. The general idea is that the wingman can direct (with the lead's concurrence) the formation to either attack or defend itself. Usually, this agreement between the lead and wingman is agreed to in the briefing.

4. When the two ship goes on the attack or on the defense, the terms 'wingman and lead' are done away with for the duration of the engagement. Instead, the pilot either attacking or under attack is called the 'Engaged Fighter', and the other pilot is the "Supporting Fighter'. Please note, this means the Engaged Fighter could be either the lead or the wingman.

5. Certain rules are set in stone. The EF, for example is only responsible for killing the bandit or defending himself. He does not have to keep the other pilot in sight, worry about airspace boundaries, or much else. The SF, on the other hand, is responsible for a number of things. He must always keep both the EF and the bandit in sight. He is responsible for flight path deconfliction between himself and the EF. And he is responsible for monitoring flight position, fuel state, other bandits, etc.

6. The EF/SF roles can be changed if the situation warrants. If the EF is trapped in lag, let's say, and the SF has a chance for a shot, then the two pilots will exchange roles.

7. This exchange of roles is done with radio calls. There is a standard vocabulary now in use that allows the lead and wingman to communicate the EF/SF Contract with minimum words. It is rigidly adhered to.

For an example of typical radio terminology, see my Wolf 20 story (Part 3) in the Air Combat Corner library.

Hope this helps...please post follow on questions if necessary.

Andy

Thanks Andy!

>Hope this helps...please post follow on questions if necessary

Well.. I was just going to be content with that great answer but... well.. since you insisted...

Using the Wolf flight example: Okay, assume that Wolf 20 has committed to the fight with the Mig-21s, lead has called "engaged" and #2 is supporting. Now a two ship of Mig-19s suddenly pops up off the deck and enters the fight. Since lead is pretty occupied at the moment Would #2 order #3 and #4 to engage the new threats (assuming that they hadn't already spotted the new bandits) or would he just report the contacts and wait for the lead to say something? I guess what I am asking is once he goes engaged, what responsibilities does the lead have to direct the battle?

Also... just for fun... while obviously not the ideal situation, what if Wolf flight is only a two ship in the case of additional bandits (and they have already committed to one fight)? Under what circumstances will the SF break leave his wingman to engage?

Thanks for taking the time to answer these questions. It is much appreciated.

Spiff

As you probably expect, there is no right or wrong answer.

If I had to find a 'one size fits all' answer to the problem of additional bandits enetering the area, it would be that those bandits now become a primary interest to the SF. He must at this point make a decision to engage them (on the basis that they are a threat either to himself or the EF) or call the EF off and attempt to disengage from the fight.

I would not advocate that the SF engage the second bandits just because he had nothing else to do!! If the SF is to leave the EF to engage the second bandits, then it has to be within the basic ROE..in other words, either in self defense or as part of his contract to continue to clear the EF's six. The SF would not engage just because he sees an offensive opportunity.

If there were the other flight members in close proximity, then the SF would certainly call them into the fight if possible. He would remain with the EF.

At what point does the SF change from engaging the second pair in defense of the EF to calling the EF off of his attack? One answer would be if it appeared to the SF that the second bandits were at or close to weapons parameters on the EF. I would not advocate that the SF wait until the EF is shot at before he calls the EF off...or in this case, tells him to break.

There most likely would be some intervening radio calls. here's an example...(the EF is moving in on his bandit as the SF gets a tally on two bandits coming up into the fight from their front quarter.)

"Heads Up, One. We've got two more bandits, your 2 o'clock low, 5 miles, press." (The 'press' means that the bandits are not yet an immediate threat and to continue. At this point, there is no indication that the bandits see the F-4s. If one or both F-4s had AI RHAW indications, this would be a different matter.)

"One, the bandits are turning into us...the bandits are your 3 o'clock, nose on to you." ( the SF has told the EF that the bandits are becoming more of a threat...he is still leaving the disengage decision up to the EF.)

"One, come hard right. Bandits, your 3 o'clock, low, 3 miles, nose on to you. I'm at your 4 o'clock, level, 1 mile." (The SF has now decided the fight has gone too far...he calls the EF off his MiG and directs a hard defensive turn. This should not surprise the EF since the SF has already described the situation. The EF now comes hard right and looks for the tally on the new bandits and the visual on the SF.)

"One's visual, no tally." (The EF sees the SF but not the new bandits.)

At this point, the SF has two options. He can call for a role change by calling 'engaged' on the new bandits, or he can continue to direct the EF with bandit advisories and hope the EF gets a tally. I like the first option the best.

"Roger. Two's tally, visual, engaged. The bandits are your 2 o'clock low, 2 miles." (Now, Two feels that the fat is in the fire far enough...his resposibility is to defend. He does this by calling engaged knowing that the lead has a visual. He can expect the lead to maintain the visual as he tries to get a tally. Two can now maneuver on the bandits and expect the lead to at least keep him in sight.)

"One's visual, no joy." (One still does not have the tally.)

"Bandits at my 10 o'clock level...I'm coming hard into them." (Two is now referencing bandit position off himself since lead sees him and can use the call to look for the bandits. A this point, Two has decided to remain tied up with the bandits by initiating a turn into them. This is not his only option. he could just as easily decided to separate...he would do that this way.)

"One, the bandits are 180 at my ten. Let's bug out heading 270." (Two has again passed the bandit position using himself as a reference, but he has decided the situation is too unpredictable..the position of the first two bandits is unknown, so Two picks a heading away from the last known bandit positions and orders a separation.)

"One, roger. Visual your 8 o'clock, no joy." (The EF has accepted the SF decision to separate.)

"Roger, one. Tally, visual. Bandits are now my 7, going away." (The bandits have not turned to engage and the EF/SF are in an extension. At this point, the EF may re-establish tactical control of the flight and assume the lead of the formation...if so, the SF will still monitor the bandits and call out their position.)

Anyway...there's a number of options here...maybe this gives you an idea of how it would go. Please note that at no time did the EF/SF Contract change. The EF remained the EF throughout the engagement. In order for the roles to reverse, the EF would have needed to get the tally after the SF called that he was engaging...the call would have been something like this..."One, roger. Tally, visual, free. Two, press." The word 'free' tells the SF that the roles have changed and that he is now the new EF...the word 'press' is the flight lead telling his wingman to continue with the attack. Note the association of the word 'free' in the EF/SF context, and the association of the word 'press' in the lead/wingman context. This is an example of how a flight lead (the original EF) can allow his wingman to direct a role reversal...the lead acknowledges the role reversal, but ultimately still controls the flight by telling his wingman (the new EF) to 'press'.

Hope this didn't muddy the water too much!!

Andy

I meant to post a thank you, but I have been amiss. In any case, thank you very much for the replies, they actually clear up a lot... I think the key point that comes through is that both the EF and the SF know what the other is doing (or about to do) at all times. I can't begin to imagine the kind of task-saturation goes on in groups greater than flight size when the fur hits the fan. Truly amazing.

Thanks again Andy

[This message has been edited by Spiff (edited October 26, 1999).]