integration of the Air Force into several already existing military and civilian federal programs would probably save a lot of money but it makes too much sense therefore I doubt it would ever happen.

the fighter aircraft component of the Air Force as mentioned already could go to the Navy/Army, the special forces of the Air Force could be also be integrated into the other branches and any aerospace support components could be integrated into NASA.

If it were at all possible, I would parcel out the tactical air assets (like the A-10) to the army and merge the existing Strategic Command with the Air Force to reform SAC, which I would rename the Strategic Aerospace Command. All aviation and missile assets with a strategic mission would be their domain, while the various branches of service would operate their own tactical air units according to there needs (which they largely do, anyway).

Within five years, I predict that a group of rocket scientists would rebel and form an independent Space Command from within SAC, because they resented competing for budgets with the fighter boys. And then it would just be the Air Force again.

Politics is politics.

Didn't we work out back in WW1 that having a seperate air force/army etc was just..basics ? With all of the forty page rambling and political bs aside..it just doesn't make sense to not have a seperate air force.

Hogwash.

+1

Latest input...

Off Target
Disbanding the Air Force Would Be a Huge Blunder
By Robert S. Spalding III JANUARY 8, 2014


Robert Farley (�Ground the Air Force,� December 19, 2013) is so far wide of the mark that he brings to mind the difference between the miss-by-a-mile bombs of World War II and the precision-guided bombs of today that fly through windows. The defense establishment is certainly in need of new ideas. But getting rid of the U.S. Air Force will do nothing to make the Pentagon more efficient or effective. In fact, such a move would do grave damage to our national security.

Farley argues that Pentagon planners pushed for an independent air force because they had �misinterpreted the lessons of World War II� to conclude that strategic bombing -- massive air raids on enemy cities -- represented the future of warfare. But military leaders favored an independent air force because of what they had learned from the North African campaign: When ground commanders controlled aircraft, the results were disastrous. As Colonel F. Randall Starbuck writes in Air Power in North Africa, 1942�43: �One example, relayed by General Doolittle, was the incident where a ground commander asked him to provide a fighter to cover a Jeep that was going out to repair a broken telephone line. He refused. The plane that would have wasted its time on that mission shot down two German Me-109s.�

The problems in North Africa were so significant that U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt actually revamped the chain of command at the Casablanca Conference in 1943, just as the Allies agreed to ramp up its bombing campaign against German cities. U.S. General Carl �Tooey� Spaatz became commander of all air forces in North Africa, charged with carrying out two missions that still belong to the U.S. Air Force: defeating enemy air forces and supporting ground campaigns. After the change in command structure, the German military leader Erwin Rommel noted: �Hammer-blow air attacks . . . gave an impressive picture of the strength and striking power of the Allied air force.� The Pentagon created the air force primarily to correct past failures, not, as Farley claims, based on �faulty conclusions about air power�s future.�

Farley criticizes the U.S. Air Force for waging bureaucratic battles against its sister services. But those battles were inevitable as the nation turned toward a Cold War strategy. In spite of the country�s war weariness in the aftermath of World War II, the newly formed air force grew quickly -- and for good reason. U.S. President Harry Truman, who staunchly opposed big military budgets, sought an inexpensive path to countering Soviet aggression and deterring a nuclear confrontation. He concluded that nuclear bombers provided the most cost-effective means of doing so. Even if deterrence failed, air power could blunt a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe. Indeed, air power became a crucial component of U.S. power during and after the Cold War. Since 1953, no U.S. soldier has died from an enemy air attack. Does it really matter, then, that increases in air force budgets left the other services feeling bruised?

Farley also claims that the U.S. Air Force�s performance in Vietnam laid bare the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing. Yet it was the force�s strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam that brought the Viet Cong back to the negotiating table. Farley also glosses over air force successes in Kosovo, which because no U.S. ground troops were involved, demonstrated the immense value of air power in the post�Cold War era. Although some analysts argue that Kosovar fighters were a de facto ground force, those fighters would not have survived without help from the air. Once the air campaign focused on hitting regime targets, air power alone created the conditions that persuaded Serbia to negotiate. That does not mean that air power is sufficient to win every war. But in Kosovo, it was.

Farley believes that the United States would be better off without the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber legs of the nuclear triad. This has been a frequent argument since the end of the Cold War. Some believe that when the Soviet Union dissolved, the threat of nuclear weapons ceased. This assertion neglects the fact that China and Russia are both modernizing their arsenals. In fact, Russia intends to rely heavily on its nuclear arsenal for future self-defense.

Farley claims that he wants the U.S. Department of Defense to save money by eliminating the air force�s two legs of the nuclear triad but evidently does not realize that they cost less than three percent of the overall DoD budget. Neglecting cost, the bombers provide the only visible demonstration of U.S. will. This fact necessitated the use of B-2s to show resolve when North Korea was threatening nuclear attacks on the United States earlier this year. Furthermore, ICBMs are the United States� most cost-effective nuclear deterrent and provide the most strategic stability.

Farley�s recommendation for the other services to assume responsibility for space and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) shows a profound misunderstanding of current U.S. Air Force capabilities. While RPAs get the most attention, the air force�s real contribution is behind the scenes: It has built an enormous worldwide collection and fusion network. The air force fuses and analyzes terabytes of data each day to provide actionable information to the warfighter. Its relentless commitment to speeding the �find, fix, track, target, engage, assess� process means that there is no service better postured to manage this global kill chain.

Farley�s analysis also fails to properly contend with the future. U.S. President Barack Obama�s commitment to a pivot toward the Pacific requires some capabilities that only the U.S. Air Force provides; its global focus makes it supremely suited to deal with the vast distances in the Pacific region. Massing troops in such a vast area takes time. The air force can do it in hours.

Farley concludes his article by arguing that the air force has become an unnecessary anachronism. Yet it has built the most sophisticated worldwide network for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the world, quickly ramping up to more than 60 around-the-clock Predator/Reaper drone patrols, all to support troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the conflict in Kosovo, U.S. soldiers and Marines on the ground have come to rely on air force eyes overhead at all times. Troops in combat can expect their calls to be answered in minutes if not seconds. Air force medical evacuation teams are able to reach critically injured troops within a �golden hour.�

Finally, the air force also plays a central role in maintaining some of the nation�s most critical infrastructure and most basic military capabilities. Every 90 seconds, an air force plane takes off to deliver cargo somewhere in the world. Air force satellites keep U.S. forces alerted to everything from the weather to nuclear detonations. Most important, the air force, unlike the other services, can strike any target on earth within a matter of hours or minutes depending on the location. The air force provides precise command and control over all of these activities -- 24 hours a day, seven days a week. No other nation possesses such capabilities. In short, air power provides the United States with an irreplaceable asymmetric advantage over its foes, and an independent air force is the key to maintaining it.

i strongly disagree

look at the simple mathematics of it.

a fighter like an f15c (i'm not talking about the E, which is a specialized ground attack plane) can be produced much more cheaply than an f22.

for every f22, how many f15c's with upgraded avionics could we produce and maintain? probably a lot, like around 6-10 of them, if you factor in all the R and D costs.

we're at a point where a lot of the money being wasted on improving airframe performance should instead be spent on improving technology to fit into existing airframes.

the old tooling which was used for creating the current inexpensive fighters like f16c's and f15c's should be remade or reactivated and new airframes should be produced, incorporating the latest tech and aerodynamics advances if it's economical to do so. (and yes, the f15's and f16's are inexpensive. look at the price tags of the alternatives, and compare the cost performance of what they can do. the older planes have way more bang for your buck, and they're still competitive with the latest generation fighters if you upgrade the technology).

the way things are going the air force is going to have no planes left at all, save for a couple of high tech f35's and f22's, and when china decides to clench its fist in taiwan, or things heat up in korea, how are a dozen pilots going to be able to stop that?


UAV's and a cheap airforce of standard airframes with a supplement of a few expensive high tech planes is the answer

Drones in various guises are where it's at; no pilot, better maneuverability, better loiter, redundancy if destroyed, basically remote drones offer everything that current manned craft don't.
I'm pretty sure that within 10 years most manned military missions will just be helicopter ops. to insert/extract troops and that's it.

Probably a dubious bonus to this is that a generation of console players operating this things would not suffer with any post combat stress as to them this is just like any other computer 'game'.

IMHO it's all about MONEY.
And the ones that want it, and the ones that don't want others to get it.

Has nothing to do with security, or protecting ourselves.
It really has nothing to do with the armed forces or the "Air Force".

It's politics.
Who gets the tax dollars.
The politicians, or the Armed Forces.

Those targets don't really matter, our ground forces were more than adequate for killing every single armored target. The targets that could have only been taken out from the air were the ones that allowed us to destroy the Iraqi army in 4 days - C4I nodes, radar stations, etc. And let's not forget destroying the morale of Iraqi troops with neverending pounding from the air.

I could conceivably see control of tactical aviation (including tactical airlift) given to the army - CAS aircraft should definitely belong to the army/Marines IMO - but I think we need a separate force for strategic airpower.

That is incredibly simplistic mathematics if you ask me. New F-15's are much more expensive than you seem to believe. The proposed F-15 "Silent Eagle" has a proposed price of $100 million each, and as such things go would probably cost even more in reality. No amount of "upgraded avionics" will make an F-15 the equivalent of an F-22. At the time of the shutdown of the F-22 production line a new F-22 could be bought for $150 million, a new F-15 at the time would sell for AT LEAST (and I am being very generous here) half that amount. So in theory one could MAYBE buy twice as many F-15's as F-22's for the same money. But who do you really think would come out on top in a fight between 20 F-15's and 10 F-22's? Even 5 F-22's would be favored over 20 F-15's. Shutting down the F-22 production line when it's flyaway cost have finally been brought down to a reasonable level was the stupidest, most short sighted act DOD has committed in a long time.

Technology moves on. Continuing to depend on a 40 year old design, even a great design like the F-15 and even after all the upgrades one could add on, is foolish.

UCAV's are also very expensive, in many cases almost as much as manned aircraft. No one is going to be using UCAV's as if they were cheap and easily replaceable.

again you're talking about completely different products. notice i specifically mentioned the difference between the f15e and f15c.

i'm not talking about silent eagles which are not even close to an f15c. they're an offshoot of the f15e. great planes but they are too expensive.

when is the next time an f15 is going to fight an f22 in real life? never

continuing to depend on a 40 year old design when it still works just fine is perfectly acceptable.

we need to reintroduce the old airframes and produce them at a lower cost. current engine technology will lower maintenance costs.

we're not dealing with world war 2 fighters here. the advancements in avionics technology, rocket motors, active stealth and jamming, communications, really nullify the need to have the entire air force fleet consisting of super expensive f22's.

aircraft are a platform for weapons. technology now allows us to fire weapons from greater distances than ever before, with better accuracy.

the air force should build up a fleet of inexpensive aircraft that can carry lots of weapons quickly and effectively.

a small number of high tech aircraft like the f22 can be dispatched to problem areas if they're necessary. there's no need to bankrupt the entire air force to fund a full fleet of these things.

The F-15C ended production in the 1980s. To restart production today would require many new components (as they're not made anymore).
You could not build NEW F-15Cs today that cheaply. Labor costs have skyrocketed. The prices for radar, ECM, and other avionics have skyrocketed.

What you propose would require going back to the 1980s, building more then, and then sticking them in a hangar for 30 years and taking them out now. THAT would make them cheaper.



The Jedi Master

Sooo many potential U.S. tactical aircraft new airframe buys and deep updates over the last 2 or 3 decades were sacrificed apon the altar of the F-22 and F-35, as well as cancelled programs such as the A-12.

No one wanted possible funding going elsewhere, nor did they want any viable alternatives to be readily presented "off the shelf" if issues came up with the next generation stuff, which they certainly did...

No, they are not completely different products. They share more in common than they have differences. If you really think that a F-15C coudl be brought back into production for 1/4, 1/5, or 1/6 the cost of an F-22 you are truly delusional.





The point is their comparative worth. A single F-22 is worth 2-5 F-15C's any day.

continuing to depend on a 40 year old design when it still works just fine is perfectly acceptable.




There is no factual information to base that assumption on.

I'm not even sure the U.S. will have much of a technological advantage when it comes to fighter aircraft in the near future, maybe vs the Chinese and 3rd world states but the Russians now seem to be rapidly eliminating their historical military weaknesses in electronics and precision manufacture.

Potentially the USAF could buy new F-15x and F-16x - the production lines are still going - but there is more chance of me winning the lottery next week - so forget it.

Public information would have you believe the F-15C/E, F-16C, A-10C will be (and are being) upgraded with new tech to keep them in service for years yet.

As for drones etc - laughable - there seems to be a lack of understanding of what they can actually do.


The only thing the USAF is getting (apart from more drones) is F-35A.

I wouldn't worry about the tech advantage considering how much each spends on it in comparison - and also looking at the state of Russian Aerospace industry - however I also wouldn't underestimate their ability to come up with some innovative solutions to get round some of the problems.

Once again, people seem to think that since the F-15C is still just as good as a Flanker we don't need stealth.

IT'S IRRELEVANT.

It has NOTHING to do with what the other side is flying, because the missiles are the same (AIM-120, AIM-9) and the radars are only slightly upgraded.

This is about the F-15 being shot down by an S-300+ before it even gets to the Flanker while the F-22 can ignore it and get the job done. The F-22 can even ignore the Flanker unless it thinks it's necessary to take it out if that's not its mission.

No F-15 is going to be gallivanting around denied airspace unless a wave of SEAD goes in first...and then who's to protect the SEAD from enemy fighters?

Nobody needs counter-fighter stealth right now, the F-22 and F-35 are there for anti-SAM stealth.



The Jedi Master

Excellent point, although I do believe that "counter-fighter" stealth is also important, no 4th gen fighter is going to survive in modern SAM defended airspace for long.

They plan to field more PAK FAs than the USAF has F-22s, and likely a similar number of SU-35BMs as the USAF will have Golden Eagles, so despite the disparity in budgets the Russians may have just as many modern heavy fighters.

The Russians have always had extremely capable scientists, even during the Cold war they had a technological lead in some areas and a theoretical lead in others, but they were always hampered by primitive industry and poor microelectronics.

That's changing now, and between that, a new Russian focus on quality over quantity and the U.S. probably having to miss out on much of a procurement cycle thanks to the cost of the wars, it may well be the Russians who have a technological edge in the 2020s.