HERO of People's Republic of Vietnam!

Day 5 - Dec. 22-23, 1972

On the fifth day of Operation LINEBACKER II B-52's did not strike targets in Hanoi. Their focus was more like a LINEBACKER I mission repeat from April of 1972. All the targets selected for B-52 strikes were in the Haiphong area. All the aircraft were from the 307th Strategic Wing out of U-Tapao, Thailand. Planners for the mission devised a route where 30 B-52Ds would bomb two targets in the Haiphong area. Twelve B-52Ds were targeted against the Haiphong railway side tracks. The remaining eighteen bombers struck the Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage facilities.




The B-52s approached Haiphong with a westerly heading from over the Gulf of Tonkin. After bombing their targets they exited the area again over the Gulf of Tonkin. To confuse the Vietnamese the B-52s entered the target area from six different directions crossing the coastline south of Haiphong. None of the routes indicated where their possible target may be. To the Vietnamese it appeared that the B-52s were heading on into Hanoi. At approximately 30 miles south of their intended bomb release points the cells of B-52s turned north and headed to their intended targets in the Haiphong area.

Chaff had been effectively laid by 16 F-4 chaff bombers over the intended trek of the B-52s about ten minutes before the BUFFs arrived over their targets. Twenty SAMs were fired into the attacking force. None of the SAMs hit any of the B-52s.

Day 5 marks the second day that no B-52s were damaged or lost.

Day 6 - Dec. 23-24, 1972

By December 23, 1972 foul weather had set in over Thailand. Problems in communication had developed between the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command. Uncertainty arose over rendezvous location of KC-135 tankers to refuel the TAC fighters and other escort planes. By the time all these problems had been resolved the Tacair forces were not able to catch up with the B-52s in time to cover their approaches to their intended targets.

Hanoi could once again sleep in this evening. Targets selected for B-52 strikes were far to the north of both Hanoi and Haiphong. Scheduled targets included the Lang Dang rail yards just 18 miles from the Chinese boarder and three nearby Vietnamese SAM sites VN 660, VN537, and VN 900. Flying accuracy was of the essence. If the B-52s drifted too far north they would violate Chinese airspace. This could have developed into something nasty had it happened.



On Day 6 of Operation LINEBACKER II 18 B-52Ds from U-Tapao were joined by 12 B-52Ds from Andersen over the Gulf of Tonkin flying in a northwest direction. Plans were for the B-52s to turn more toward the northwest and head inland over their targets. To confuse the Vietnamese who operated the SAM sites the B-52s would drop 2,000 feet in altitude just prior to releasing its ordinance. After releasing their bombs they would change altitude again. The cells of bomber that struck SAM sites would delay their post target turn until the other B-52s had completed theirs. This insured that all the B-52s were not in a turn at the same time and maximized the combined use of the ECM equipment of the B-52s. After bomb release the B-52s exited the target area in a southeasterly direction and headed back out over the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Vietnamese were caught by total surprise. They had no expectations that the United States would bring the B-52s that close to the Chinese boarder. Only four SAMs were fired at the B-52s none of which caused any damage. The B-52s were in an out of Lang Dang rail yards within sixteen minutes. Usually the Vietnamese could predict a B-52 attack by the presents of Tacair forces prior to the attack. MiGs were scrambled and vectored to the B-52s. It was reported that two of the B-52 cells were fired upon by air-to-air missiles from the MiGs. None of which reached their targets.

On Day 6 again no B-52s were lost or damaged.

Thanks for this review, CAT!

Happy Holidays,

Day 7 - Dec. 24, 1972

Christmas Eve 1972--for the past seven nights the United States had sent its B-52 bombers over North Vietnam. A majority of the 405 sorties flown as of December 24, 1972 had been concentrated on military targets in Vietnam's capitol city of Hanoi.

The first three evenings of Operation LINEBACKER II nine B-52s had been shot down with another five B-52s damaged by the 114 Soviet made SA-2 Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMS) launched at the fleet.

After the third evening, targets in Hanoi was avoided in hopes to prevent further aircraft losses, preserve B-52 crewmen's lives, and raise crew moral. Missions flown on the previous three nights seem to be doing all three.

No B-52s had been shotdown or damaged since the early morning hours of December 22, 1972.

Missions to be flown on the evening of December 24, 1972 were scheduled following these same tactics. The 307th Strategic Wing at U-Tapao, Thailand provided the 30 B-52Ds necessary to carry out the mission. Twelve B-52Ds were would be the Kep rail yards and the eighteen other B-52Ds would bomb the Thai Nguyen rail yards. Each of these targets were located about forty miles north of Hanoi. Mission plans called for the bomber force to separate, approach the target from multiple directions, and fly at different altitudes while over the target areas. By striking the rail yards, crippled Hanoi's efforts to resupply SAM missiles to their air defense forces. Hanoi was running out of SAM missiles.




The Vietnamese were again caught by surprise. MiGs were scrambled to attack the B-52s. Two cells of B-52s were threatened by a MiG. On December 24, 1972, Airman First Class Albert Moore, the aerial gunner onboard RUBY 03 engaged one of the MiGs and shot it down as it closed within 2,000 yards of his aircraft. This was the second MiG shot down by a B-52 during combat. PURPLE 02, a B-52D, tail number 5051, experienced AAA flak from its initial point (IP) to its bomb release point (BRL) for about five seconds causing only minor damage. Damage to the aircraft was discovered upon completion of the mission after landing safely back at U-Tapao.

Dec. 25, 1972

President Nixon had ordered that bombing of targets in North Vietnam be halted for a period of 36 hours beginning at midnight (Washington DC time).
All B-52 missions throughout Vietnam were discontinued.



The purpose of this bombing halt was to allow mission planners to review the events so far, give the B-52 crews some rest, and prepare the aircraft for the mission on December 26, 1972.

The North Vietnamese used the opportunity of the bombing halt to restock their dwindling supply of Surface to Air missiles.

As Operation LINEBACKER II continued on December 26, 1972 a new bombing plan was put into action.
The biggest ever B-52 formation, 120 B-52s, 72 of which were targeted against Hanoi, and the remaining 48, B-52's seeking targets in the Haiphong area.

The mission was designed as one massive assault of the entire 120 plane bomber force.

The B-52's would deliver their bombs at the simultaneously on 10 different targets in the Hanoi-Hiaphong area. All aircraft would be drop their ordinance within a 15 minute timeframe. In order to do this tactics used during the last three days of the operation were incorporated into the plan.

Eagerly waiting for the new version!

p.s. Hpasp; Check the SimHQ review link on your site

SAMSIM v923 released, introducing the SA-75M Dvina (SA-2F) system, and the biggest bombing after World War-II.




http://sites.google.com/site/samsimulator1972/

Thank Hpasp and merry chrismast and happy new year

Hpasp, Can you make additional document over Vietnam, Middle East, Serbia and PacVar Theater SAM/AAA procedures and Historical Review?

Awesome! Thank you very much Hpasp!

So after some familiarization, I tried first Linebacker mission. And instantly noticed some issues with this system. In order to 'burn' through, target have to be pretty much above you since there is no "wide/narrow/pencil beam". Ouch! And then I can only choose "11 seconds arm" or "desensitized fuze". Makes things difficult vs chaff.

Also, I think I found a bug. It seems fighters like to react when I shoot in the blind at a jammer. (they descent quickly)

Here's result of my first try.

Not sure if this was posted before. 52 voice recording while flying over Hanoi
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECGKCD-pqiM&feature=related

Also, I think I found a bug. It seems fighters like to react when I shoot in the blind at a jammer. (they descent quickly)

That is correct behavior.
When you launch, your RPK antenna start transmitting missile guidance commands. (K1,K2,later K3) "Q" panel RPK indication.
This illuminates a BIG RED LIGHT on the fighter RWR suite. (missile launch)

The fighter visually checks if the missile is aimed against him, and try to avoid it, by descending.

Here's result of my first try.

Due to the dwindling missile stock, it was strictly forbidden to launch against anything but the B-52's.
Even the most successful battery commander had tough hours to explain why he expended one missile against an F-111...

Thanks for update Hpasp!

On 4th scenery, if select no historical scenery, the Sa-4 search radar show hanoi and haipong but I change to fire control and return, the search radar change to training grounds map

Day 8 - Dec. 26, 1972

Day 8 began with the largest formation of B-52s ever assembled into a single wave. One Hundred Twenty B-52's, 78 from Andersen (45 B-52G's and 33 B-52D's) along with 42, B-52D's from U-Tapao. The better ECM equipped B-52D's were used to strike targets in Hanoi. Of the 72, B-52D's attacking Hanoi targets, the Duc Noi rail yards was struck by 9 B-52D's entering Hanoi from the North West. The Kinh No vehicle complex was struck by 9 B-52D's entering the target area from the North West. The Hanoi rail yards was struck by 9 B-52D's arriving on the target area from the North East. Hanoi petroleum product storage facility was struck by 9 B-52D's flying into Hanoi from the North East. 18, B-52D's arriving to the area from the South West struck the rail yards of Giap Nhi. A Vietnamese SAM site, VN 549, was struck by 3, B-52D's from the South East. Also arriving from the South East was 15 B-52D's that hit the Van Dien vehicle repair depot in Hanoi.

The B-52G's were used to strike the Thai Nguyen rail yards north of Hanoi. This target was struck by 15, B-52G's accompanied by 3, B-52D's arriving on the target area from the North West. The remaining B-52G's arriving from Andersen approached the coastal city of Haiphong in two attack formations. One, a 15 plane group of B-52G's from the North East targeting the Haiphong transformer station, and another identical group arriving from the South East bombing the Haiphong rail yards.

Hanoi air defense launched 45 SAMs at the attacking B-52s.

EBONY cell was a two ship cell flying at 36,500 feet, bombing the Giap Nhi rail yards located in the South Eastern part of Hanoi. EBONY 01 had TWS and uplink signals four minutes prior to the bomb release point (BRL), and employed maximum jamming against the TWS with two transmitters on the downlink frequency. EBONY 02, a B-52D, tail number 6674, was hit at 11:42PM local Hanoi time, and downed while in the post-target turn by one of a barrage of four SAMs probably fired from the North Vietnamese SAM battery 257/76. EBONY cell penetrated a very dense SAM environment with several SAMs observed from 3 minutes prior to until 3 minutes after release of their bombs. EBONY 02 was broadside to SAM site 257/76 at this point. The broadside aspect, insufficient down-link jamming, and insufficient mutual support caused by the two ship cell were all contributing factors to the loss of EBONY 02.

Three minutes later at 11:45PM Hanoi time, ASH cell, also a two ship cell flying at 36,500 feet was approaching its target, the Kinh No vehicle complex just north of Hanoi. It is reported that MiGs may have been attacking ASH cell as they began making hard evasive maneuvers prior to the BRL. These maneuvers caused ASH cell to veer 8 to 11 NM left of their intended track to the target. It was know that ASH 02 had one E/F transmitter that was inoperable at the time. Prior to BRL, ASH 02 had three uplink signals and no TWS. ASH 02 employed two jammers against the downlink. ASH 01 jamming considerations are unknown. ASH 01, a B-52D, tail number 6584, was hit approximately eleven NM left of planned track by a SAM launched by 261/93 and damaged. Separation from the wave and burn-through by several SAM sites were contributing factors to this incident. The crew of the strickened bomber continued to fly the B-52 towards U-Tapao. ASH 02 crashed while attempting to land at U-Tapao as it overshot the runway and burst into flames approximately one mile beyond the end of the runway.

A heroic effort was made by another B-52 crewman who had just landed from his mission to rescue the co-pilot of ASH 02 from the burning wreckage. Also surviving the ordeal was the gunner who managed to escape from his turret in the back of the aircraft.

Two more B-52D's were damaged by SAMs while bombing the Hanoi rail yards.

CREAM cell was approximately three to five NM left of fragged track inbomnd and on track on the outbound leg from the target. CREAM 01, a B-52D, tail number 5062, was flying at 31,000 feet. CREAM 02, a B-52D, tail number 5090, was at an altitude of 31,500 feet. ECM was degraded by the loss of two E/F transmitters in CREAM 02. CREAM 02 and CREAM 03 had TWS signals while CREAM 01 and CREAM 03 had an uplink approximately seven minutes prior to BRL. All three aircraft employed maximum jamming against the TWS signals and each aircraft had two transmitters on the downlink frequency. The cell penetrated a dense SAM enviroment with four SAMs observed by CREAM 02 at the time of the engagement. The exact location where the damage occurred is difficult to determine since the damage was very minor and only discovered during a post flight inspection of the aircrafts. Site burnthrough and broadside profile to the SAM sites were contributing factors to the engagement.

BLACK 03 B-52D 56-0629 was hit over Duc Noi at 37,000 MSL. Landed at U-Tapao.
63 manhours was required to repair fourteen external holes plus three dents.

How far goes V-750VKU 11DKU for 11 secons?

How far goes V-750VKU 11DKU for 11 seconds?

4~5km depending on launch angle.

The solid fuel booster accelerates it to 550m/sec in 3sec after launch.
The liquid stage is accelerating the missile to 800~1200m/s (depending on flight angle) during the 50sec of flight.

On 4th scenery, if select no historical scenery, the Sa-4 search radar show hanoi and haipong but I change to fire control and return, the search radar change to training grounds map

I wait for the bugs to came out, than approx New Years Eve, I upload the corrected version, v923.1


No LORO, no USU, no I87V is tough...