It appears that none of the three pilots seemed to understand that their plane was not actually flying but instead falling and they did everything but lower the nose, in spite of stall warnings and other audible indicators. It seems eerily similiar to the crash in Buffalo, New York, several years ago where, even though the stick shaker let the pilot know that the aircraft was stalling, he kept pulling back on the yoke. My question to the experienced pilots on this forum is this: Is there something that plane manufacturers can do, apart from having a 2x4 come out of the instrument panel and hitting the pilot on the head, to keep this from happening again? Do you think it's poor training? Or is it because they become fixated on instruments (in the Air France incident) that malfunctioned due to freezing and ignored other instruments and warnings? I in no way pretend to have an answer and can only imagine the confusion that must have reigned, but I am genuinly curious if there is something that can be done to preclude this sort of thing from happening again.
Also, I am wondering how the pilots in the Air France crash were able to keep their plane from entering into a spin? Are the modern jets with their FBW technology able to keep "upright" even though they are in a deep stall? Interested in any comments from the pilots on this forum as to what they think of this horrible tragedy.
It appears that none of the three pilots seemed to understand that their plane was not actually flying but instead falling and they did everything but lower the nose, in spite of stall warnings and other audible indicators. It seems eerily similiar to the crash in Buffalo, New York, several years ago where, even though the stick shaker let the pilot know that the aircraft was stalling, he kept pulling back on the yoke. My question to the experienced pilots on this forum is this: Is there something that plane manufacturers can do, apart from having a 2x4 come out of the instrument panel and hitting the pilot on the head, to keep this from happening again? Do you think it's poor training? Or is it because they become fixated on instruments (in the Air France incident) that malfunctioned due to freezing and ignored other instruments and warnings? I in no way pretend to have an answer and can only imagine the confusion that must have reigned, but I am genuinly curious if there is something that can be done to preclude this sort of thing from happening again.
Also, I am wondering how the pilots in the Air France crash were able to keep their plane from entering into a spin? Are the modern jets with their FBW technology able to keep "upright" even though they are in a deep stall? Interested in any comments from the pilots on this forum as to what they think of this horrible tragedy.
I don't know what went on in the cockpit of that flight but in an airline you're taught how to deal with an airspeed indicator failure and if you do it properly it's no big deal. You just dig out the flight manual and open the page that has a chart that shows the pitch attitude & power setting you need to fly level at various altitudes and weights. Once you have some time on the aeroplane you can get those pretty close without having to open a book and so there's no rush or panic to get it sorted out. For example on the 747 I used to fly as long as you have 90% fan speed on the engines (no need to reference the EPR gauges) you need between 2.1 and 2.6 nose-up and that'll give you a good half hour up your sleeve before you have to really worry about getting too high or low.
If that was the only real failure then I don't see a need to change anything, we're already trained to deal with it.
FWIW I had it happen in a little turboprop I used to fly a few years ago.
No big deal at all, as in this case the FO's ASI was still working. It came good when we descended into warmer air.
Out of ammo Out of energy Out of ideas Down to harsh language
You would think that their heads would tell them they were falling but with no reference to the outside they continued to fly the airplane wrong thus worsening their situation. I saw the Nat Geo special on this and they pretty much got it right, poor SOB's were screwed.
Windows 10 Pro Gigabyte 970A DS3P FX AMD FX6300 Vishera 3.5 Ghz ASUS STRIX GeForce GTX 970 Overclocked 4 GB DDR5 16Gb Patriot Viper 3 RAM DDR3 1866Mhz Onikuma Gaming Headset (has annoying blue lights I don't use)
I remember a documentary about one tourist-bomber coming back from the Caribian which had failures in the instruments. The pilots managed to roll the plane on its back without noticing (of course it was night to) cause they all the time had pulled 1 G untill it fell straight down into the Atlantic.
i7 6700k @ 4,5 GHz GTX1070 Asus Z170 Pro Gamer 16 GB RAM 500 GB Crucial CT500MX200 SSD Toshiba DT01ACA300 HDD Samsung SyncMaster BX2450 LED W10 64
As fast as the plane was already falling according to reports, putting it nose down to restore lift they most likely would not have had time to level out and return to a safe climb away from the ground level.
I just think that someone up high is covering someone else's butt by saying it was recoverable, basically blaming the deceased because they cannot defend themselves to protect someone that's truly to blame.
Every pilot I know, knows: No Airspeed Indicator + Rapidly Decreasing Altitude + Stall Warning = the plane is falling flat at a low forward airspeed. lower nose get airspeed and lift over the surfaces, level off and recover.
They kept the plane flat by keeping the nose up, the ailerons had a little effect on roll due to air moving rapidly in a vertical direction, so moving the ailerons had the same effect of a skydiver moving his hands. The plane had some forward airspeed and stability from the engines.
Apparently the pilots/crew were unaware that they had little to no forward airspeed?? All they heard and saw was STALL so they kept trying to nose up, which was only keeping the plane in a free fall.
There was definitely panic going around the cockpit. But the fact that they kept trying to pull up w/ no forward airspeed indicator is a training error.
just My $.02
Last edited by SkateZilla; 08/02/1102:47 PM.
HAF922, Corsair RM850, ASRock Fata1ity 990FX Pro, Modified Corsair H100, AMD FX8350 @ 5.31GHz, 16GB G.SKILL@DDR2133, 2x R7970 Lightnings, +1 HD7950 @ 1.1/6.0GHz, Creative XFi Fata1ity Platinum Champ., 3x ASUS VS248HP + Hanns�G HZ201HPB + Acer AL2002 (5760x1080+1600x900+1680x1050), Oculus Rift CV CH Fighterstick, Pro Throt., Pro Pedals, TM Warthog & MFDs, Fanatec CSR Wheel/Shifter, Elite Pedals Intensity Pro 10-Bit, TrackIR 4 Pro, WD Black 1.5TB, WD Black 640GB, Samsung 850 500GB, My Book 4TB
I always amazes me. The "common sense factor" in this accidents. It happened so many times with speed indicators malfunctioning.
I'm no pilot, just sims. But if I don't know what's my speed, the first thing I do is throttle to a position I know gives me some enough trust, and then put my nose a little below the horizon. I mean, AFIK, the artificial horizon is independent of other controls and is powered by its own power source. Even if not, what are the chances that it is malfunctioning and the other things are ok... You have more than one on the cockpit. Common sense will tell me to pay attention to that thing, and not the pitot probes, which have been found to fail so many times. If it works for a crappy pilot like me, it should work with a real pilot.
Sure, put me on a real cockpit on the middle of the night, and well... maybe my common sense vanishes.
I would think training makes them aware of these things, but apparently not.
When you're feeling sad, just remember that somewhere in the world, there's someone pushing a door that says "pull".
One thing people discount is the almost overwhelming urge to correct a situation that appears abnormal even when you know what you are looking at is telling you the wrong thing.
Put a malfunctioning attitude indicator in front of most people flying IFR and you will likely quickly see things go south. In fact, tell the person that the ADI is wrong, yet leave it uncovered, and their experience will wrongly cause them to revert back to it just out of the habit of doing so.
I have no idea what information was being presented to the Air France crew. Without knowing what the attitude indicator (primary, secondary, and backup) were displaying it is hard to make heads or tails of what they were seeing compared to what the aircraft is doing. It sounds like the crew were surprised, quickly got task saturated, and things snowballed from there. If they had an independent "peanut" gyro or backup ADI it would seem intuitive to put the aircraft symbol on the horizon, pick a medium power setting and then figure out things from there.
You have to remember though, that the corrective actions could have caused secondary instrumentation results that would have led them back down the path to loss of control. For instance, if they leveled out, and actually started building airspeed, depending on what parts of the pitot/static system were working or not they could have at that time gotten a rapidly increasing VSI and altitude readout (as pressure ram air pressure on the pitot builds the differential between the static pressure would send a signal to the instrument that they were perhaps descending (thicker air)..) Etc..etc...
High altitude upsets are not easy to deal with. At night, in turbulence, in a thunderstorm... all bets are off. Training should have kicked in, but apparently it didn't. And it didn't sound like the Captain who came back on the flight deck was any help.
Hello, hard to say what happened. It looks (! not sure) as if the plane was sinking wth the nose up all the time, with the pilots unable to figure out the angle of the plane. Seems the only working indicators were horizontal (roll) display and altitude, which means that the pitot tubes were out of order (frozen? electronics?) indicating wrong or no speed. There is meanwhile an Airbus instrument "update" including an additional electronic instrument for that case. Not aboard said Air France machine.
Usually you would put the nose down to make more speed and get out of the stall, this also includes powering down of the engines because more push will make the nose rise again even if diving at an angle.
I want you to remember the case when this Airbus overshot the runway in Poland back then, because of a software error that forbade reverse power as long as both shock struts had not contact to the ground (the plane landed not horizontally because of bad side winds - only one strut compressed - computer forbade reverse power - software error). Problem is all fly-by-wire planes have lots of problems, including Boeing .. most software is being programmed by people who have no idea of flying, or the general view. Frankly, i think they will blame it on the pilots, bad software does not sell planes.
Why don't you try this with your favorite sim before saying they couldn't fly?
Make sure you're flying in pitch black night, and that your view shows instruments only - you can't see outside so you shouldn't be having any view of the outside. A flight map display, if you have it, is permitted. You have to fly a distance of at least 100nm to reach an emergency landing airfield.
Start with a stabilized aircraft at 30000', fail instruments. Have fun.
Hello, hard to say what happened. It looks (! not sure) as if the plane was sinking wth the nose up all the time, with the pilots unable to figure out the angle of the plane. Seems the only working indicators were horizontal (roll) display and altitude, which means that the pitot tubes were out of order (frozen? electronics?) indicating wrong or no speed. There is meanwhile an Airbus instrument "update" including an additional electronic instrument for that case. Not aboard said Air France machine.
Usually you would put the nose down to make more speed and get out of the stall, this also includes powering down of the engines because more push will make the nose rise again even if diving at an angle.
I want you to remember the case when this Airbus overshot the runway in Poland back then, because of a software error that forbade reverse power as long as both shock struts had not contact to the ground (the plane landed not horizontally because of bad side winds - only one strut compressed - computer forbade reverse power - software error). Problem is all fly-by-wire planes have lots of problems, including Boeing .. most software is being programmed by people who have no idea of flying, or the general view. Frankly, i think they will blame it on the pilots, bad software does not sell planes.
Greetings, Catfish
The article I read was already blaming the pilots, saying the black box data shows the stall / incident was fully recoverable.
HAF922, Corsair RM850, ASRock Fata1ity 990FX Pro, Modified Corsair H100, AMD FX8350 @ 5.31GHz, 16GB G.SKILL@DDR2133, 2x R7970 Lightnings, +1 HD7950 @ 1.1/6.0GHz, Creative XFi Fata1ity Platinum Champ., 3x ASUS VS248HP + Hanns�G HZ201HPB + Acer AL2002 (5760x1080+1600x900+1680x1050), Oculus Rift CV CH Fighterstick, Pro Throt., Pro Pedals, TM Warthog & MFDs, Fanatec CSR Wheel/Shifter, Elite Pedals Intensity Pro 10-Bit, TrackIR 4 Pro, WD Black 1.5TB, WD Black 640GB, Samsung 850 500GB, My Book 4TB
One thing people discount is the almost overwhelming urge to correct a situation that appears abnormal even when you know what you are looking at is telling you the wrong thing.
Put a malfunctioning attitude indicator in front of most people flying IFR and you will likely quickly see things go south. In fact, tell the person that the ADI is wrong, yet leave it uncovered, and their experience will wrongly cause them to revert back to it just out of the habit of doing so.
I have no idea what information was being presented to the Air France crew. Without knowing what the attitude indicator (primary, secondary, and backup) were displaying it is hard to make heads or tails of what they were seeing compared to what the aircraft is doing. It sounds like the crew were surprised, quickly got task saturated, and things snowballed from there. If they had an independent "peanut" gyro or backup ADI it would seem intuitive to put the aircraft symbol on the horizon, pick a medium power setting and then figure out things from there.
You have to remember though, that the corrective actions could have caused secondary instrumentation results that would have led them back down the path to loss of control. For instance, if they leveled out, and actually started building airspeed, depending on what parts of the pitot/static system were working or not they could have at that time gotten a rapidly increasing VSI and altitude readout (as pressure ram air pressure on the pitot builds the differential between the static pressure would send a signal to the instrument that they were perhaps descending (thicker air)..) Etc..etc...
High altitude upsets are not easy to deal with. At night, in turbulence, in a thunderstorm... all bets are off. Training should have kicked in, but apparently it didn't. And it didn't sound like the Captain who came back on the flight deck was any help.
Well said.
Loss of control at high altitude at night isn't easy to deal with when you're faced with instrument failure, but I still can't shake the feeling the pilots were at least partly in error. When you're at FL380, which was where they were cruising at the outset, you have a lot of time to push the stick forward, build airspeed and recover, which should have been their first instinct upon hearing and seeing TRIPLE stall warnings. I can't believe they held the stick back almost though the entire descent.
In all my years I've never seen the like. It has to be more than a hundred sea miles and he brings us up on his tail. That's seamanship, Mr. Pullings. My God, that's seamanship!
Loss of control at high altitude at night isn't easy to deal with when you're faced with instrument failure, but I still can't shake the feeling the pilots were at least partly in error. When you're at FL380, which was where they were cruising at the outset, you have a lot of time to push the stick forward, build airspeed and recover, which should have been their first instinct upon hearing and seeing TRIPLE stall warnings. I can't believe they held the stick back almost though the entire descent.
I'm guessing they were almost completely in error actually... My only real reservation is saying "it was as simple as dumping the nose" which might in fact be true, but difficult to discern under the circumstances. The reason people land gear up with the landing gear horn blaring incessantly in the background is that they block out all that they aren't focusing on. So you could have had a dozen alarms saying "stall" and if they were focused on other things it wouldn't matter in the slightest.
Beach covered it well. The only thing I have to add is that when I was in pilot training, we spent almost as much time in the T-38 instrument sim as we did in the real aircraft, and all of that time was learning how to stay alive when every instrument on the panel was either correct, bad (red flagged), or lying to you -- and then they made you recover from an unusual attitude. My instructor once set me up so that so much had failed I had to do a needle, ball, and airspeed approach (at 300 knots) to get below the overcast so I could land. It was excellent training that I believe all pilots should have, and for commercial pilots it should be mandatory.
[quote=BeachAV8R So you could have had a dozen alarms saying "stall" and if they were focused on other things it wouldn't matter in the slightest.
[/quote]
This is what I was talking about when I jokingly (but only barely joking) in my original post about a 2x4 coming out of the instrument panel to hit the pilot in the head when they are in a situation like this. I'm sure had those same ill-fated pilots been reading about this accident with a different crew involved they would be saying the same things we are, which begs the question: What can be done to keep this from happening again? Or is it such a freak accident that we should just chalk it up to inadequate training? I'm glad I'm not involved in answering this question because I wouldn't have a clue.
#1 the vsi is one of the best instruments in the cockpit. far less complicated than the other instruments, and basically as long as you're at 0 you're safe
#2 spit on the windscreen and watch which way it goes if you're in a really dire situation. sounds ridiculous but even small vertical and lateral g forces will make it move around. you can figure out what's happening to your plane by watching slime around on the windscreen
Here is more info on the crash, including a (partial) transcript of the Voice Recorder
There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the universe is for it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened.
Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Jun 1st 2009, aircraft entered high altitude stall and impacted ocean By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 29th 2011 16:35Z, last updated Saturday, Jul 30th 2011 20:27Z
The BEA have released their third preliminary report in French. While it doesn't appear there have been additions to the factual part already released in report #2, report number #3 contains first analysis of the crash.
In there the BEA reported, that the aircraft departed Rio de Janeiro with the captain in the left hand seat, the first first officer in the right hand seat and the second first officer in the observer seat.
At 01:55Z the captain left his seat in order to take his rest, the second first officer took the captain's seat. The first first officer (in the right hand seat) became pilot flying (PF), the second first officer pilot monitoring (PNF).
The captain was observing the briefing the two first officers conducted. The PF pointed out there was a little bit of turbulence ahead according to weather radar's image but they couldn't climb, pointing out the FMS indication of maximum possible cruise level of 375. Subsequently the captain left without leaving any instructions with the first officers, especially not assigning tasks. This absence of formal framework later led to a breakdown of optimal crew cooperation between the two first officers.
The turbulence increased, at 02:08Z the PF decided to turn left by 12 degrees selecting heading mode into the autopilot. The PF remarked he would prefer to climb to FL360. Intensive weather radar observations followed however were interrupted by a sensation of quick temperature increase and the appearance of an odour that distracted the crew for more than a minute. The PNF finally identified the smell as ozone.
Discussions in the cockpit did not suggest any malfunctions.
At 02:09:46Z the background noise on the cockpit voice recorder significantly changed, the BEA analysed the sound was consistent with the characteristics of presence of ice crystals, the change in sounds getting the attention of the first officers who had not experienced this before. The PNF takes action and suggests to slow down to Mach 0.8 and engages engine anti-ice on.
At 02:10:05Z a sharp drop of airspeed indications occurred likely due to obstruction of the pitot probes by ice crystals. The autopilot and autothrust systems disengaged as result. The presence of turbulence led to the aircraft rolling right to a bank angle of 8 degrees, the nose pitches up to 11 degrees nose up within 10 seconds. The PF announces "I have control" and makes a quick left nose up input almost to the mechanical stops of the side stick. The nose pitches further up and at 02:10:10Z the stall warning activates.
Between 02:10:18Z and 02:10:25Z the PNF reads various ECAM messages, then attracts the attention of the PF to the loss of speed. At that time both left hand and ISIS airspeeds were below 100 knots, the aircraft was climbing by 7000 feet/min and the aircraft rolls left and right, with the bank angle remaining between -10 and +10 degrees of bank, as result of PF inputs. Both first officer recognized the loss of airspeed indications, however none called for the unreliable airspeed procedures. Comparing the three airspeed indications the PNF urges the PF multiple times to lower the nose. The aircraft was climbing through FL370 and continued to climb.
At 02:10:34Z the left airspeed sharply rose to 215 KIAS and became valid again, the speed indication of the stand by instrument (ISIS) remained wrong. The BEA analysed that the speed was 60 knots from the point of autopilot disengaging until that time, the 60 knots loss of speed being consistent with the aircraft climbing 2000 feet in that configuration.
At 02:10:47Z the thrust levers were moved to about 2/3 of travel resulting in 85% N1. The climb rate reduced to 100 feet/min, the angle of attack reduced to about 3 degrees and the roll is controlled. The first officers now attempt to call the captain back to the cockpit. The BEA analyses that after a quick trim and levelling off as result of PF inputs the trajectory of the aircraft appeared controlled again, however the initial increase in altitude was excessive and should have been pointed out by the PNF. However, none of the pilots called out speeds, vertical speeds, pitch angles or altitude.
At 02:10:51Z the stall warning activated again, the pitch angle had increased to about 6 degrees nose up. As result of PF inputs the pitch angle increased from 6 to 13 degrees and the angle of attack increased to 10 degrees. Rapid onset of buffeting occurred. 5 seconds later the thrust levers are placed into the TOGA detent. The BEA analysed that was about the point where the aircraft went out of control.
The PF maintains inputs to keep the nose up between 11 and 23 degrees nose up with the angle of attack being betwen +11 and +18 degrees.
At 02:11:07Z the ISIS airspeed becomes valid at 183 KIAS, and all three indicated airspeeds agree. The PF selected ADR3 as input for his primary flight display. The vertical speed drops through 0 and becomes highly negative (around 4000 feet/minute sink rate), the airspeed reduces further to 160 KIAS.
At 02:11:20Z the PF states twice he has lost control of the aircraft.
At 02:11:37Z the PNF pushes the priority button and provides a large left input in reaction to a high right bank, calling "controls on the left". He almost instantly released the priority button and ceased control inputs again without required calls.
At 02:11:42Z the captain entered the cockpit, just before the stall warning stops, the airplane was at 35800 feet MSL, 9100 feet/min sink rate, airspeeds below 100 KIAS, pitch 12 degrees nose up and engines at 102% N1. Neither first officer provides an account to the captain what is happening. The BEA analysed that when the stall warning stopped all three AoA computations had become invalid due to too low an airspeed. Airspeeds are no longer displayed on both PFDs.
At 02:12:04Z the PF remarked he believed they were in overspeed, the BEA assumes because of the excessive background noise in the cockpit. None of the two other pilots supported that hypothesis which was in contradiction to instrument indications, high pitch angle and high rate of descent.
Until impact now the stall warning activates when the nose is lowered and silences when the pitch angle increases. FDR data suggest that as soon as the stall warning activates the pilots react with nose up inputs which cause the stall warning to silence again.
The BEA analysed that none of the three pilots ever worked out which indications to trust and which not.
The BEA analysed that both first officers had been trained unreliable airspeed emergency maneouvers at low altitude which required them to disengage flight directors and autoflight systems, then adopt an attitude between 10 and 15 degrees nose up. At altitude however the stall warning would activate at an angle of attack just above +4 degrees.
The BEA listed following findings:
- The Captains departure occurred without clear operational instructions
- The crew composition was in accordance with the operators procedures
- There was no explicit task-sharing between the two copilots
- The weight and balance of the airplane were within operational limits
- The crew had noticed returns on the weather radar
- The crew made a heading change of 12 to the left of its route
- The AP disconnected while the airplane was flying at upper limit of a slightly turbulent cloud layer
- There was an inconsistency between the measured speeds, likely as a result of the obstruction of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment
- At the time of the autopilot disconnection, the Captain was resting
- Even though they identified and announced the loss of the speed indications, neither of the two copilots called the procedure "Unreliable IAS"
- The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual aircraft handling
- No standard callouts regarding the differences in pitch attitude and vertical speed were made
- There is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain
- The speed displayed on the left PFD remained invalid for 29 seconds
- The approach to stall was characterised by the triggering of the warning, then the appearance of buffet
- A short time after the triggering of the stall warning, the PF applied TO/GA thrust and made a nose-up input
- In less than one minute after the disconnection of the autopilot, the airplane was outside its flight envelope following the manual inputs that were mainly nose-up
- Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplanes longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces
- Neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning
- Neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation
- The invalidity of the speed displayed on the ISIS lasted 54 seconds
- The Captain came back into the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the autopilot disconnection
- The angle of attack is the parameter that enables the stall warning to be triggered; if the angle of attack values become invalid, the stall warning stops
- By design, when the speed measurements were lower than 60 kts, the 3 angle of attack values became invalid
- Each time the stall warning was triggered, the angle of attack exceeded its theoretical trigger value
- The stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds
- The airplanes angle of attack was not directly displayed to the pilots
- Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilots inputs
- The engines were working and always responded to the crews inputs
- No announcement was made to the passengers
Air France commented: "It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crews difficulty in analyzing the situation. During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions. At this stage, there is no reason to question the crews technical skills."
The French BEA released new safety recommendations mainly recommending to introduce an AoA indication on the cockpit instruments, introducing additional training for manual aircraft control at altitude, additional definitions for the role of a relief captain to ensure proper task sharing in the cockpit as well as recommendations regarding flight data recorders.
Translated Transcript (PIC: Captain, PF: Pilot Flying, PNF: Pilot monitoring): Time Source 02:00:33 PF Well a bt of turbulence which you just saw we will we should find it again before, in fact we are in the cloud layer unfortunately as we can not climb too much for the moment because of the temperatue which is sinking less than expected. This is reducing the REC MAX for us a little lower to go for 37 (FL370) 02:06:44 PF The ITC, there it is between SALPU and TASIL 02:06:54 PF Minus 42, we are not going to use the anti ice it is still there 02:07 PF You see we are really on the limit of the cloud layer. 02:08:07 PNF Can you maybe turn a bit to the left? I agree that we are in manual, right? 02:08:19 PNF What I call manual means we are not in managed mode (Nav) 02:09:54 PNF Here, Ill reduce the speed a bit for you. 02:10:03 PF Do you want to switch to Ignition Start? 02:10:06 PF I have control 02:10:09 PF Ignition Start 02:10:11 PNF What is this? 02:10:14 PF We dont have a good We dont have a good indication of . 02:10:17 PNF We have lost the speeds, engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust 02:10:18 PF speed 02:10:22 PNF Alternate Law Protections 02:10:24 PNF Wait, we are about to loose 02:10:25 PNF Wing Anti-Ice 02:10:27 PNF Watch your speed, Watch your speed PF Ok, ok, I will descend back PNF You are stabilizing PF Yeah PNF You are descending back 02:10:33 PNF According to the three you are climbing, now you are descending. 02:10:35 PF Agreed 02:10:36 PNF You are at descend back PF It is going, we are descending back 02:10:39 PNF Ill put you on A T T (*) (Selecteur ATT /HDG is put in position F/O on 3) 02:10:42 PF We are, yes we are in climb 02:10:49 PNF Where is he, eh? 02:10:56 PF TOGA 02:11 PNF Try to use the lateral controls as few as possible hey! 02:11:03 PF I am in TOGA 02:11:06 PNF is he coming or not 02:11:21 PNF We have certainly the engines, what is happening? 02:11:32 PF I dont have control of the aircraft, I dont have control of the aircraft at all 02:11:38 PNF Command to the left (taking control) 02:11:41 PF I have the impression that we have speed. (we are in speed) 02:11:43 PIC Hey, what are you doing? PNF What is happening, I dont know, I dont know what is happening 02:11:53 PIC Ok, take, take this 02:11:58 PF have a problem, I have no more vertical speed here PIC Agreed PF I have no indication at all. 02:12:04 PF I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, no, what do you think? [Speedbrakes are deployed] 02:12:07 PNF NO, dont extend them! Certainly not. 02:12:13 PNF What do you think, what doyou think, what do we have to do? 02:12:15 PIC I dont know, it descends. 02:12:10 PF Here, that is good, we have wings level, no it doesnt want. PIC Wings to level, the horizon, the backup horizon. PNF The horizon (secondary) 02:12:26 PNF The speed? 02:12:27 PNF You are climbing, VS Stall Stall PNF You are descending, descending descending 02:12:30 PF I am descending? PNF Descend! 02:12:32 PIC No, you are climbing 02:12:33 PF Here, I am climbing, okay, right so lets descend (or okay we are descending) (unclear) 02:12:42 PF OK, we are in TOGA 02:12:42 PF On the altitude where are we? 02:12:44 PIC this is not possible 02:12:45 PF On alti(tude) we are where? 02:12:45 PNF What do you mean on altitude? PF Yes, yes, yes, I am descending there, no? PNF Yes, you are descending. PIC Hey, you are in. put the wings level, PNF Put the wings level! PF That is what I am trying to do PIC Put the wings level 02:12:59 PF I am at the limit of, with the warping PIC The rudder 02:13:25 PF What, how is it that we are continuing to descend at the limit there? 02:13:28 PNF Try to find what you can do with the controls up there, The primaries e.t.c. 02:13:32 PF At level 100 02:13:36 PF 9000 ft 02:13:38 PIC Carefull with the rudder! 02:13:39 PNF Climb, climb. Climb, climb 02:13:40 PF But I am at the limit of the nose since a while PIC No, no, no, dont climb PNF So descend 02:13:45 PNF So, give me the controls, to me the controls. PF Go ahead, you have the controls, we are still on TOGA 02:14:05 PIC Careful, you are nose high (cabres? ) PNF I am nose high? PF Well, we need to, we are at 4000 ft 02:14:18 PIC Go, Pull PF Go, Pull pullpull 02:14:26 PIC Ten degrees pitch
Editorial note: at 02:12:04Z the transcript mentions the speedbrakes have been deployed, the FDR graphics as well as the remainder of the report do not mention at all whether the speedbrakes have been extended or not.
l'Audace, toujours l'audace
I dont have pet peeves; I have major, psychotic hatreds. - George Carlin
Even if you have a crown and sit at a throne In the end you will have nothing Even if you are destined for great riches In the end you will return to the dust
And it didn't sound like the Captain who came back on the flight deck was any help.