Day 6 - Dec. 23-24, 1972

By December 23, 1972 foul weather had set in over Thailand. Problems in communication had developed between the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command. Uncertainty arose over rendezvous location of KC-135 tankers to refuel the TAC fighters and other escort planes. By the time all these problems had been resolved the Tacair forces were not able to catch up with the B-52s in time to cover their approaches to their intended targets.

Hanoi could once again sleep in this evening. Targets selected for B-52 strikes were far to the north of both Hanoi and Haiphong. Scheduled targets included the Lang Dang rail yards just 18 miles from the Chinese boarder and three nearby Vietnamese SAM sites VN 660, VN537, and VN 900. Flying accuracy was of the essence. If the B-52s drifted too far north they would violate Chinese airspace. This could have developed into something nasty had it happened.



On Day 6 of Operation LINEBACKER II 18 B-52Ds from U-Tapao were joined by 12 B-52Ds from Andersen over the Gulf of Tonkin flying in a northwest direction. Plans were for the B-52s to turn more toward the northwest and head inland over their targets. To confuse the Vietnamese who operated the SAM sites the B-52s would drop 2,000 feet in altitude just prior to releasing its ordinance. After releasing their bombs they would change altitude again. The cells of bomber that struck SAM sites would delay their post target turn until the other B-52s had completed theirs. This insured that all the B-52s were not in a turn at the same time and maximized the combined use of the ECM equipment of the B-52s. After bomb release the B-52s exited the target area in a southeasterly direction and headed back out over the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Vietnamese were caught by total surprise. They had no expectations that the United States would bring the B-52s that close to the Chinese boarder. Only four SAMs were fired at the B-52s none of which caused any damage. The B-52s were in an out of Lang Dang rail yards within sixteen minutes. Usually the Vietnamese could predict a B-52 attack by the presents of Tacair forces prior to the attack. MiGs were scrambled and vectored to the B-52s. It was reported that two of the B-52 cells were fired upon by air-to-air missiles from the MiGs. None of which reached their targets.

On Day 6 again no B-52s were lost or damaged.


Hpasp
Free SAM Simulator, "Realistic to the Switch"

(U-2 over Sverdlovsk, B-52's over Hanoi, F-4 Phantoms over the Sinai, F-16's and the F-117A Stealth bomber over the Balkans.)
http://sites.google.com/site/samsimulator1972/home

Book from the author - Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Hungary 1961-1991
https://sites.google.com/view/nuclear-weapons-in-hungary/

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